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Abstract—Information-Centric Networking (ICN) replaces the
widely used host-centric networking paradigm in communica-
tion networks (e.g., Internet, mobile ad hoc networks) with an
information-centric paradigm, which prioritizes the delivery of
named content, oblivious of the contents’ origin. Content and
client security, provenance, and identity privacy are intrinsic in
the ICN paradigm versus the current host centric paradigm where
they have been instrumented as an after-thought. By design, the
ICN paradigm inherently supports many security and privacy
features, such as provenance and identity privacy, which are still
not effectively available in the host-centric paradigm. However,
given its nascency, the ICN paradigm has several open security and
privacy concerns. In this article, we survey the existing literature
in security and privacy in ICN and present open questions. More
specifically, we explore three broad areas: security threats, privacy
risks, and access control enforcement mechanisms.
We present the underlying principle of the existing works,
discuss the drawbacks of the proposed approaches, and explore
potential future research directions. In security, we review attack
scenarios, such as denial of service, cache pollution, and content
poisoning. In privacy, we discuss user privacy and anonymity,
name and signature privacy, and content privacy. ICN’s feature of
ubiquitous caching introduces a major challenge for access control
enforcement that requires special attention. We review existing
access control mechanisms including encryption-based, attribute-
based, session-based, and proxy re-encryption-based access control
schemes. We conclude the survey with lessons learned and scope
for future work.
Keywords–Information-centric networking, security, privacy, ac-
cess control, architecture, DoS, content poisoning.
1. INTRODUCTION
According to the Cisco Visual Networking Index forecast,
video traffic (including VoD, P2P, Internet, and TV) will
comprise 90% of all Internet traffic by 20191. The majority
of this traffic is currently served to end users with the help
of content delivery networks (CDNs), with servers that reside
close to the network edge. This has helped reduce core network
traffic and improve delivery latency. Despite the scalability that
CDNs have so far provided, the current host-centric paradigm
will not continue to scale with the proliferation of mobile
devices and the Internet of Things (IoTs) coupled with the
rapidly increasing volume of video traffic. In the IoT domain,
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every node can be a provider. This results in several many-
to-many communications, which increases the size of routing
tables and requires maintenance of per node multicast trees,
thus undermining scalability. Not only have these trends been
putting pressure on Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and
content providers, but they have also motivated the research
community to explore designs for a more scalable Internet,
with a primary objective of efficient content delivery. One
of the products of this endeavor is the Information-Centric
Networking (ICN) paradigm [1]–[3].
ICN shifts the networking paradigm from the current host-
centric paradigm, where all requests for content are made to
a host identified by its IP address(es), to a content-centric
paradigm, which decouples named content objects from the
hosts where they are located. As a result, named content
can be stored anywhere in the network, and each content
object can be uniquely addressed and requested. Several ICN
architectures such as Named-data networking/content-centric
networking (NDN/CCN) [1], Publish-Subscribe Internet Rout-
ing Paradigm (PSIRP) [2], Data Oriented Network Architecture
(DONA) [4], and Network of Information (NetInf) [5] have
been proposed. Though they differ in their details, they share
several fundamental properties: unique name for content, name-
based routing, pervasive caching, and assurance of content
integrity. ICN enhances several facets of user experience as
well as security, privacy, and access controls. However, it also
gives rise to new security challenges.
In this article, we explore ICN security, privacy, and ac-
cess control concerns in-depth, and present a comprehensive
study of the proposed mechanisms in the state of the art.
We categorize this survey into three major domains, namely
security, privacy, and access control. In the security section,
we address denial of service (DoS and distributed DoS or
DDoS) attacks and vulnerabilities unique to ICN, including
cache pollution, content poisoning, and naming attacks. Despite
many similarities between a classical DoS attack and the DoS
attack in ICN, the latter is novel in that it abuses ICN’s stateful
forwarding plane. The attack aims to overload a router’s state
tables, namely the pending interest table (PIT). The cache
pollution attack targets a router’s content locality with the
intention of altering its set of cached content resulting in an
increase in the frequency of content retransmission, and reduced
network goodput.
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In the privacy section, we study the privacy risks in ICN
under four classes: client privacy, content privacy, cache pri-
vacy, and name and signature privacy [6]. We explore the
implications of each of these risk classes and elaborate on
relevant proposed solutions. Due to ICN’s support for pervasive
caching, content objects can be replicated throughout the net-
work. Though this moves content close to the edge and helps
reduce network load and content retrieval latency, it comes at
a cost—publishers lose control over these cached copies and
cannot arbitrate access. Thus, there is need for efficient access
control, which allows reuse of cached content and prevents
unauthorized accesses.
Access control mechanisms based on content encryption,
clients’ identities, content attributes, or authorized sessions
have been proposed in the literature. We review these proposed
mechanisms and highlight their benefits and drawbacks in detail
in the access control section. In the three domains, we present
a summary of the state of the art and also discuss open research
challenges and potential directions to explore. We conclude the
survey with a summary of lessons learned.
Before we dive into the discussion, we briefly review some
representative ICN architectures in Subsection 1.A. Following
that we identify previous surveys in ICN covering different ICN
architectures, naming and routing, DoS attacks, mobility, and
potential research directions in Subsection 1.B.
A. Overview of the Proposed Information-Centric Networking
Architectures
In this subsection, we review some representative ICN ar-
chitectures including DONA [4], CCN [1], [7], NDN [8],
PSIRP/PURSUIT [2], [9], [10], NetInf [5], and Mobility-
First [11], [12]. We refer interested readers to two surveys [13],
[14] for more details on other ICN architectures, such as
SAIL [15], 4WARD [16], COMET [17], [18], CONVER-
GENCE [19], and CONET [20]. In this survey, we will focus
on research relevant to three architectures in particular, namely
CCN [1], [7], NDN [8], and PSIRP/PURSUIT [2], [9], [10].
These three have received the most attention from the commu-
nity in the past and continue to be favored as architectures of
choice.
The Data Oriented Network Architecture (DONA) [4] was
proposed by Koponen et al. at UC Berkeley in 2007. DONA
uses a flat self-certifying naming scheme. Each name consists
of two parts; the first is the cryptographic hash of the publisher’s
public key, and the second is an object identifier, which is
assigned by the publisher and is unique in the publisher’s
domain. To achieve self-certification, the authors suggested that
publishers use a cryptographic hash of the object as the object
identifier. A subscriber can then easily verify the integrity of
an object simply by hashing it and comparing the result to
the object’s name. DONA’s resolution service is composed of
a hierarchically interconnected network of resolution handler
(RH) entities, which are tasked with publication and retrieval
of objects.
To publish an object, the owner sends a REGISTER message
including the object name to its local RH. The local RH, keeps
a pointer to the publisher and propagates this message to its
parent and peer RHs, who then store a mapping between the
local RH’s address and the object name. A subscriber interested
in the object sends a FIND message with the object name to
its own local RH. The local RH propagates this request to its
parent RH. The propagation continues until a match is found
somewhere in the hierarchy.
After finding a match, the request is forwarded towards
the identified publisher. The authors proposed two methods
of object delivery from a publisher to a requester. In the first
method, the publisher sends the object using the underlying IP
network. The second method takes advantage of path symmetry:
the request message records the path it takes through the
network. After reaching the publisher, the object traverses the
reverse path from the publisher to the requester. Exploiting
this routing model, RHs on the path can aggregate the request
messages for an object and form a multicast tree for more
efficient object dissemination/delivery.
Content-centric Networking (CCN) [1], [7] was proposed by
researchers at Palo Alto Research Center in 2009. In 2010,
Named Data Networking (NDN) [8], which follows the same
design principles, was selected by the US National Science
Foundation (NSF) as one of four projects to be funded under
NSF’s Future Internet Architecture program. Both CCN and
NDN share the same fundamentals, such as a hierarchical
naming scheme, content caching, and named content routing
(NDN was CCN before it branched out). The hierarchical
naming allows the provider’s domain name to be used in
making routing decisions. In the client-driven CCN/NDN, a
client sends an interest packet into the network to request a
content by its name.
Routers, equipped with a content store (CS), a pending
interest table (PIT), and a forwarding information base (FIB),
receive the interest and perform a CS lookup on the content
name. If the content is not available in the CS, the router
performs a PIT lookup to check whether there is an existing
entry for the requested content. If the PIT lookup is successful,
the router adds the incoming interest’s interface to the PIT entry
(interest aggregation) and drops the interest. If no PIT match
is found, the router creates a new PIT entry for the interest and
forwards the interest using information from the FIB.
An interest can be satisfied either by an intermediate forward-
ing router which has cached the corresponding content chunk,
or the content provider. In both cases, the content takes the
interest’s reverse-path back to the requester. Upon receipt of a
content chunk, a router forwards the chunk along the interfaces
on which it had received the corresponding interests for the
chunk. The router may cache a copy of the content in its CS
in addition to forwarding it through the designated faces.
The Publish Subscribe Internet Technology (PURSUIT) [10]
project and its predecessor Publish Subscribe Internet Routing
Paradigm (PSIRP) [2], [9], were funded by FP7 (European
Union’s research and innovation program) to produce a publish-
subscribe protocol stack. A PURSUIT network is composed
of three core entities, namely Rendezvous Nodes (RNs) which
form the REndezvous NEtwork (RENE), the topology manager,
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Fig. 1: The organization of the survey.
and forwarders. Similar to DONA, PURSUIT uses a flat naming
scheme composed of a scope ID, which groups related infor-
mation objects, and a rendezvous ID, which ensures that each
object’s identifier is unique in its group. A publisher advertises
its content by sending a PUBLISH message to its local RN
(the RN in the publisher’s vicinity), which routes the message
to the RN designated to store the content name defined by the
scope (designated RN). The local RN makes this decision using
a distributed hash table (DHT). A subscriber interested in the
content object sends a SUBSCRIBE message to its local RN,
which will also be routed to the designated RN using the DHT.
Upon receipt of a SUBSCRIBE message by the designated
RN, the topology manager is instructed to generate a delivery
path between the publisher and the subscriber. The topology
manager then provides the publisher with a path through the
forwarders. In PURSUIT, network links are each assigned a
unique string identifier, which the topology manager uses to
create a routing Bloom filter for each flow. The generated
Bloom filter is then added to each packet’s header, and is used
by the intermediate forwarders for content delivery.
Network of Information (NetInf) [5] was initially conceived
in the FP7 project 4WARD [16]. NetInf employs a flat naming
scheme with a binding between names and their locators, which
point to the content’s location. As several nodes can cache
copies of the data, an object may be bound to more than one
locator. Two models of content retrieval are offered by NetInf:
name resolution and name-based routing. In the name resolution
approach, a publisher publishes its data objects to the network
by registering its name/locator binding with the name resolution
service (NRS). An interested client resolves the named data
object into a set of locators and subsequently submits a request
for the object, which will be delivered by the routing forwarders
to the best available cache.
The routing forwarders, after obtaining the data, deliver it
back to the requester. In the name-based routing model, a client
directly sends out a GET message with the name of the data
object. This message is forwarded to an available storage node
using name-based routing, and the data object, once found, is
forwarded back to the client.
MobilityFirst [11], [12] was funded by the NSF’s future
Internet Architecture program in 2010. The main focus of this
architecture is to scale in the face of device mobility, hence
it includes detailed mechanisms for handling mobility, wire-
less links, multicast, multi-homing, security, and in-network
caching. Each network entity (including devices, information
objects, and services) is assigned a globally unique identifier
(GUID), which can be translated into one or more network
addresses. To advertise a content, a publisher requests a GUID
from the naming service and registers this name with a global
name resolution service (GNRS).
The registered GUID is mapped, by a hash function, to a
set of GNRS servers, which are connected through regular
routing. A subscriber can then obtain the content name from
a Name Certification Service (NCS) or use a search engine to
resolve a human-readable name into the corresponding GUID.
A subscriber submits a GET message, containing both the
GUID of the desired object and its own GUID, to its local
router. Since routers require the network address, the request
will be forwarded to the GNRS to map the GUID into actual
addresses. The result of this query is a set of partial or complete
routes, or a set of addresses.
Upon receiving this information, the requesting router at-
taches the destination network address to the GET message
and forwards it into the network. Any router on the forwarding
path may contact the GNRS for an updated destination address
or route; routes may change due to events, such as provider’s
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Fig. 2: ICN security sub-categories and the state-of-the-art.
mobility, congested link, and link failure. The publisher, upon
receiving the GET message, sends the requested object back to
the source GUID following the same procedure. MobilityFirst
provides a combination of IP routing and name-based routing
by name resolution and data routing processes. On-path caching
is employed to satisfy subsequent requests for previously served
GUIDs. This is in contrast to off-path caching, which causes
an update in the GNRS service, where the new caching node’s
network address is added to the GUID’s record.
B. Review of Existing ICN Surveys and Overview Literature
Ahlgren et al. [13] reviewed the different proposed
information-centric architectures. In addition to describing the
architectures in detail, the authors also presented their open
challenges. Following this survey, Xylomenos et al. [14]
surveyed the proposed ICN architectures, comparing their
similarities and differences, and discussing their weaknesses.
Tyson et al. focused on mobility in information-centric net-
works in [72]. Several benefits of node mobility were discussed
by the authors, as well as mobility-related challenges such
as provider mobility and cached content discovery. Zhang,
Li and Lin [73] and Zhang et al. [74] explored proposed
caching approaches in information-centric networking. In [75],
Bari et al. reviewed the state-of-the-art in naming and routing
for information-centric networks and explored the requirements
for ideal content naming and routing. Future research di-
rections in information-centric networking were discussed by
Pan et al. [76].
Aamir and Zaidi [77] surveyed denial-of-service attacks in
information-centric networks and identified interest flooding,
request piling, content poisoning, signature key retrieval, and
cache pollution as DDoS vectors. AbdAllah et al. [78] recently
discussed security attacks in ICN. The authors classified attacks
into four categories: routing, naming, caching, and miscella-
neous. The paper focused on discussing the ways an attacker
can orchestrate these attacks as well as the applicability of
current IP-based solutions to information-centric networks.
In other overview work, Marias et al. [68] identified security
and privacy concerns in a future Internet architecture. They
reviewed physical layer security, network coding security, and
network infrastructure security literature and identified authen-
tication and identity management as core building blocks of
a secure network, and discussed implementation challenges.
However, the authors did not elaborate on the attacks that are
inherent to ICN, such as cache pollution, content poisoning,
DoS/flooding, and the timing attack. Furthermore, a review
of existing access control mechanisms for ICN has been ne-
glected. Wahlisch et al. [69] discussed the threats and security
problems that arise due to stateful data planes in ICN. The
authors categorized these attacks into three classes: resource
exhaustion, state decorrelation, and path and name infiltration.
Despite presenting a thorough attack classification, this paper
did not discuss any mitigation to the aforementioned attacks.
In [66], Fotiou et al. discussed the security requirements
and threats in pub/sub networks including client privacy, access
control, content integrity, confidentiality, and availability, and
subscriber and publisher authentication, and user subscription
anonymity. However, they did not propose any solutions.
Loo et al. [71] studied the security challenges faced by the
NetInf architecture from the perspectives of both applications
and infrastructure. The authors divided their concerns into eight
categories: access control, authentication, non-repudiation, data
confidentiality, data integrity, communication security, avail-
ability, and privacy. However, the descriptions of the problems
and proposed solutions are at a high level and lack details or
scope of future challenges.
Novel Contributions of this Survey: All the existing sur-
veys have either not dealt with security, privacy, and access
control or have looked at them to a very limited extent. The
work of AbdAllah et al. [78] is the first survey dealing with
security in ICNs, but it is not comprehensive. The survey deals
more with the generic security concerns, without covering the
ICN-specific body of the work in depth. Also, access control
in ICNs has not be considered in any survey. To the best of
our knowledge, we are the first to present a comprehensive
survey of the state-of-the-art in security, privacy, and access
control in the context of ICN. We present each of these three
aspects independently, surveying the state of the art, lessons
learned, and the shortcomings of proposed approaches. We also
discuss existing challenges and propose potential directions and
solutions.
The rest of the paper is organized as depicted in the Fig. 1. As
depicted in the figure, we classify the state of the art in security
and privacy in terms of attacks and corresponding proposed mit-
igations. As for access control, we divide the state of the art in
terms of the mechanism used in the proposed solutions, which
either address authentication and/or authorization. In Section 2,
we review the security issues of different ICN architectures,
their proposed solutions, and existing open problems. Different
privacy issues, proposed solutions, and open challenges are pre-
sented in Section 3. Access control enforcement mechanisms,
their drawbacks, and existing open challenges are presented
in Section 4. In Section 5, we summarize the state of the
art and present a comprehensive discussion of future research
directions.
2. SECURITY IN ICN
In this section, we review vulnerabilities in ICN and discuss
the state-of-the-art solutions, then conclude this section with
open problems and potential solutions to be explored. This
section is divided into subsections based upon the particular
types of attacks. In Fig. 2, we show our categorization of
the state of the art in security research. We divide the liter-
ature in the state of the art into six categories based on the
particular attack and its mitigation approaches: DoS; content
poisoning; cache pollution; secure naming, forwarding, and
routing; application security; and other general contributions
(i.e., contributions that cannot be grouped into one of the above
specific subcategory). In the following subsections, we discuss
each of these subcategories in detail in the order they appear
here.
A. Denial of Service (DoS) Attack
DoS attacks aim to overwhelm the network services by
inundating them with requests; e.g., server(s) inundated with
requests for service (content, domain name queries, etc.) [79]–
[81]. In ICN, DoS attacks may target either the intermediate
routers or the content providers. The most basic type of
attack, interest flooding, involves an attacker sending interests
for a variety of content objects that are unlikely to exist in
the targeted routers’ caches. This attack applies to pull-based
(consumer-driven) architectures such as CCN/NDN, DONA,
and NetInf, where the intermediate entities are the attack targets
(e.g., PIT in CCN/NDN, RH in DONA, and NRS in NetInf).
The attack scenario in CCN/NDN is depicted in Fig. 4,
which shows clients and an attacker connected to an edge
router, which can cache content. The network is composed of
a content provider at one end (on the right) and the routing
core consisting of routers without content cache and the routers
with content cache. In this scenario, the edge router connected
to the attacker as well as legitimate clients has its PIT filled up
disproportionately by the attacker’s interests. The interest name
/attack/C* refers to some undefined content name that may not
exist, is inaccurate, or is a request for dynamic content to be
created on-the-fly.
This attack is more severe when the attacker requests fake
content objects (i.e., names with a valid prefix and an invalid
suffix) or dynamic objects, which need to be generated by the
provider on demand. Requests for fake objects will result in
the provider dropping the interest; while the PIT entries on
the targeted router(s) (e.g., routers on the path) will only get
purged on expiration (expiration time can be large for interests).
On the other hand, dynamic content requests will have to be
served by the provider. However, these requests/replies burden
the forwarding routers as well as they may not be aggregated
(most dynamic content is not popular), and may also cause DoS
at the provider.
Fig. 3 illustrates the DoS countermeasures categorization.
We categorize the research in DoS mitigation into three broad
categories: rate limiting approaches in which a router miti-
gates DoS attacks by throttling interests it receives from its
downstream neighbors; statistical modeling approaches, where
a node detects DoS by using statistical information on PIT
occupancy. The last category includes several approaches that
include using stateless forwarding and client’s proof-of-work.
1) Rate Limiting-Based Countermeasures: A large body
of literature exists on rate limiting-based DoS mitigation ap-
proaches in which a router detects a DoS attack by monitoring
the timeout rates of interests on its faces and/or size of its
PIT occupied with interests. When attack is detected a router
limits the interest arrival rate on its suspicious faces. We sub-
categorize the rate limiting approaches further into per-face
information monitoring and PIT size monitoring approaches.
a) Per-Face Monitoring Approaches: In general, in the
per-face monitoring approaches, a router stores information,
such as the number of timed-out interests and the ratio of
incoming interests to outgoing content. Using the collected
information, the router detects an ongoing attack and mitigates
it by rate limiting the faces through which it receives malicious
interests.
Afanasayev et al. [21] proposed three approaches to coping
with interest flooding attacks in NDN. Their vanilla approach
is a slight modification of the well-known Token Bucket
algorithm, in which each router limits the number of pending
interests for each interface proportional to its uplink capacity
(bandwidth-delay product). This technique cannot differentiate
between an attacker and a legitimate user’s interests. Hence
an attacker can commandeer the entire uplink capacity with
its interests, hence reducing the satisfaction rate of legitimate
clients’ interests.
The authors augmented this vanilla approach by introducing
a concept of per-interface fairness, where the outgoing link
capacity is shared fairly among traffic from all incoming
interfaces (each incoming interface has its own queue). This
prevents traffic from a minority of incoming interfaces from
consuming the entire link capacity. An interface with a high
interest arrival rate is subjected to packet queuing for fairness.
This approach improves fairness, but there is still no distinction
between an attacker and a legitimate client.
The last proposal differentiates interest timeout events from
interest satisfaction events. Each router gives the interfaces
with higher satisfaction rates a greater share of the outgoing
link capacity. However, this approach can unduly penalize
interfaces that have interests that follow a larger path length.
The greater the path length, the larger the probability of con-
gestion and interest drops, which reduces the satisfaction rate
of the corresponding interface. Also, with more routers along
the path the probability of rate limiting of a flow increases.
To address this drawback, the authors suggested that routers
explicitly announce their interest satisfaction ratio limits to
their downstream neighbors, who can accordingly adjust their
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Fig. 3: Denial of Service countermeasure sub-classes and the state-of-the-art.
own acceptance thresholds. This algorithm, despite being more
effective, still applies penalties at the granularity of interface,
not flow. Legitimate users’ flows will still suffer.
Gasti et al. [22] also explored DDoS attack scenarios in
NDN, focusing primarily on interest flooding. The authors
divided interest flooding scenarios into classes depending on
whether the attackers request (1) existing or static, (2) dy-
namically generated, or (3) non-existent content objects. The
attack target for Types (1) and (3) is only the network-
core infrastructure, while the Type (2) attack targets both
content providers and the network-core. The authors noted that
malicious requests for existing or static content has limited
effect due to content caching at intermediate routers.
In contrast, requesting dynamically generated content not
only consumes intermediate routers’ resources (such as PIT
space and bandwidth), but also keeps the providers busy. It
was noted that non-existent content is the type most likely
to be used in attacks against infrastructure. To mitigate the
attack, the authors suggested that routers keep track of the
number of pending interests per outgoing face, as well as
the number of unsatisfied interests per incoming face and/or
per-name prefix. Rate limiting is applied when these counters
exceed a predefined threshold. We note that the per-name prefix
based rate limiting is a better approach than per-interface rate
limiting.
Compagno et al. [23] designed Poseidon, a collaborative
mechanism for interest flooding mitigation. Poseidon involves
two phases: detection and reaction. Detection is performed
individually at the router which monitors two values over a time
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Fig. 4: Denial of Service (DoS) attack scenario: The attacker
fills-up the edge router’s PIT with a disproportionate number
of requests.
window: ratio of incoming interests to outgoing content, and
the amount of PIT state consumed by each interface. When a
pre-set threshold is reached the router invokes the collaborative
mitigation mode. The router rate limits its interfaces with
abnormal interest arrival rates and sends attack notification to
its downstream routers. This helps downstream routers to detect
the attack at an earlier stage.
The authors noted that rate-limiting was more effective at
reducing the attacked router’s PIT size than the notification
mechanism, however notification improved the satisfaction rate
of requests. This mechanism also does not address the differen-
tiation between the attacker and the legitimate user. Legitimate
clients collocated on the same interface with an attacker can be
adversely affected.
b) Approaches that Monitor PIT Size: PIT size growth
rate can be used to detect DoS attacks as well. In most of
the proposed approaches, a router constantly monitors the size
of its PIT. If the PIT size reaches a threshold, the router enters
the mitigation phase.
Dai et al. [24] proposed an approach inspired by the IP-
traceback approach for mitigating interest flooding. The scheme
allows an attack to be “traced back” to the attacker. The interest
traceback procedure is triggered when a router’s PIT size
exceeds a predefined threshold. On trigger, the router generates
a spoofed data packet for the longest-unsatisfied interest in the
PIT. The spoofed data will be forwarded to the attacker, causing
its edge router to be notified of the malicious behavior; in
response, the edge router can rate-limit the attacker’s interface.
Similar to other rate-limiting approaches, this mechanism
may also have a negative impact on legitimate clients. A
legitimate client that mistakenly requests a non-existent (or yet-
to-be-created) content, will be unfairly penalized. Additionally,
since rate limiting only occurs at the edge router, this scheme
may be ineffective if an edge router is compromised or is non-
cooperative with its peers.
2) Statistical Modeling-Based Countermeasures: The sta-
tistical modeling-based approaches rely on statistical informa-
tion of a router’s PIT and interfaces to identify an abnormal
traffic pattern. For instance, Wang et al. [25] proposed an
interest flooding detection and mitigation mechanism based on
fuzzy logic and routers cooperation. In the detection part, the
core routers monitor their PIT Occupancy Rate (POR) and PIT
Expiration Rate (PER), which represent the rate addition of
new entries into a PIT and the rate of PIT entry expiration,
respectively. The collected real-time POR and PER values are
used through fuzzy inference rules to identify if they are normal
or abnormal.
If either value is abnormal, the router triggers a mitigation
mechanism. The router identifies the targeted prefix and the
interface on which the most interests for that prefix have
arrived; applies rate-limiting to that interface; and notifies its
downstream neighbor on the interface of the targeted prefix for
more rate control. Simulation results show the schemes’ effec-
tiveness in reducing PIT memory consumption and increasing
legitimate interest satisfaction. However, the assumption that
the attackers only target a specific name prefix makes mitigation
only effective in dismantling attacks against specific publish-
ers not against the network infrastructure itself. Moreover, a
distributed DDoS attack is still feasible.
Nguyen et al. proposed an interest flooding detector based
on statistical hypothesis testing theory [26]. The scheme is
based upon the fact that when under attack, the interest rate
on an interface is greater than that during normal conditions.
Meanwhile, the data rate under both hypotheses remains the
same; therefore, the data hit-ratio in attack scenarios is lower
than that in normal conditions. Unlike other solutions, this
scheme takes the desired false alarm probability as a parameter
and calculates the detection threshold accordingly. However,
the evaluation uses only a simple binary tree graph with eight
clients and one attacker. The effectiveness of the scheme for
larger networks or during distributed attacks is difficult to
analyze.
3) Other Countermeasures: This category of DoS mitiga-
tion includes approaches that change routers’ structures, such as
PIT and content store, or inherently reduce the clients’ request
rates by requesting proof-of-work.
a) Approaches that Modify Router’s PIT or Cache: The
approaches in this category focus on DoS attacks targeting
the routers’ PITs. The solutions proposed include augment-
ing the routers with bigger PIT, longer caching period, and
removing suspicious interests from routers’ PITs. For instance,
Wang et al. [27] investigated the effect of content caching on
DoS attacks, focusing on CCN in particular. They compared
the DoS attacks targeting content providers in IP-based and
content-centric networks, and proposed a queuing theory based
model for DoS attacks modeling. This model considers the
caching period of content objects as well as queuing delay at
repositories. The authors concluded that DoS attacks in CCN
(also applies to NDN) have limited effectiveness in comparison
to DoS attacks on IP networks due to satisfaction on interests at
intermediate routers. Due to this phenomenon, interest flooding
can be localized significantly by increasing routers cache sizes
and the timeout period of content in caches.
Despite the correctness of the authors’ models, the authors
use several unrealistic assumptions. The authors assumed that
an attacker only requests content objects that are available at
the content provider(s) and may be cached. However, this is not
a complete attack scenario; an attacker can request either non-
existent content or dynamically-generated content (which may
be unpopular and hence useless when cached). Also, the anal-
ysis provided does not account for cache replacement policies,
which would affect the content caching period. Furthermore,
intermediate routers would be more vulnerable targets to DoS
than content providers. However, the impact of DoS on routers
was not discussed.
Virgilio et al. [28] analyzed the security of the existing PIT
architectures under DDoS attack. The authors compared three
proposed PIT architectures: (1) SimplePIT, which stores the
entire URL, (2) HashPIT, where only a hash of the URL is
stored, and (3) DiPIT (distributed PIT), where each interface
uses a Bloom filter to determine which content objects should
be forwarded. The authors concluded that all three proposed
PIT architectures are vulnerable to DDoS attack, and they
all perform the same under normal traffic conditions. While
SimplePIT and HashPIT suffer from memory growth in the
face of DoS, DiPIT does not consume extra memory. The
Bloom filter’s inherent false positive rate has the potential to
cause data to be forwarded unnecessarily, and therefore waste
bandwidth. Although this paper showed the effects of DDoS
on different PIT architectures through simulation, the authors
did not propose any viable solution.
Wang et al. [29] proposed a mechanism which copes with in-
terest flooding by decoupling malicious interests from the PIT.
The mechanism requires that each router monitors the number
of expired interests for each name-prefix, then adds a prefix
to the malicious list (m-list) if this count exceeds a chosen
threshold. To prevent legitimate name-prefixes from staying in
the m-list, each m-list entry is assigned an expiry time, after
which the prefix is removed from the m-list. However, an m-
list entry’s expiry timer is reset if a new interest arrives for the
same prefix.
The authors overcome the extra load on the PIT table size by
putting information in the interest. Although this helps routers
keep the sizes of their PITs manageable, they will still be
responsible for forwarding the malicious interests; thus network
congestion and starvation of legitimate clients are still possible.
This mechanism also puts additional processing burden on the
routers and increases packet overhead.
Wang et al. [30] modeled the interest flooding attack in NDN
by considering factors, such as routers’ PIT sizes, round trip
times, PIT entries’ TTLs, content popularity distribution, and
both malicious and legitimate interest rates. The authors derived
a DoS probability distribution, which evaluates the probability
that a legitimate interest will be dropped due to starvation.
Simulation results confirmed the validity of the model. The
authors suggested that the effectiveness of DoS could be
reduced by using bigger PITs, bigger content stores, and shorter
TTLs for PIT entries. Nonetheless, these suggestions do not
actually address the problem: an attacker could easily increase
its request rate proportionally.
b) Approaches that Require Client’s Proof-of-Work:
Proof-of-work approaches, reduce the request rate from clients
(because of the delay in obtaining the proof) and serve as a
barrier which only serious clients will overcome to use the
network. In the ICN literature, there has been one such work.
TABLE I: Classification of DoS/DDoS Mitigation Approaches and Their Salient Features
Mechanism Target Content Type Mitigation Approach Router’s Functionality Scope
Rate Limiting
Afanasayev et al. [21] Router Non-Existent Rate Limiting & Per-face Fairness PIT Extension Individual RoutersPer-face Statistic & Priority Storing Statistics Router Collaboration
Gasti et al. [22] Provider Dynamic Rate Limiting & Per-face Statistics Storing Statistics Individual RoutersRouter Existing & Non-Existent
Compagno et al. [23] Router Non-Existent Rate Limiting & Per-face Statistics Storing Statistics Router Collaboration
Dai et al. [24] Router Non-Existent Rate Limiting & PIT Size Monitoring Not Applicable Router Collaboration
Statistical Modeling
Wang et al. [25] Router Non-Existent Fuzzy Logic-based Detection Storing Statistics Router Collaboration
Nguyen et al. [26] Router Non-Existent Statistical Hypotheses Testing Theory Storing Statistics Individual Routers
Other Countermeasures
Wang et al. [27] Provider Existing Caching Period Increase Not Applicable Individual Routers
Wang et al. [29] Router Non-Existent Decoupling Malicious Interest from PIT Additional Queue Individual Routers
Wang et al. [30] Router Existing Bigger PIT and Cache Not Applicable Individual Routers
Li et al. [31] Provider Dynamic Client’s Proof-of-Work per Interest Not Applicable Not Applicable
Li and Bi [31] proposed a DoS countermeasure for dynamic
content requests using proof-of-work. As opposed to static
content, which is signed once when it is generated, a dynamic
content object is generated and signed upon interest arrival. A
high rate of dynamic content requests can thus overload the
content provider with signature computation, causing DoS. To
deter potential attackers the authors proposed a proof-of-work
mechanism where the client requests a meta-puzzle from the
content provider. Upon receiving the meta-puzzle, the client
generates the actual puzzle and solves it (similarly to how
blocks are mined in Bitcoin). The puzzle solution and the
current timestamp form a part of the interest, which is verified
by the provider.
4) Summary and Future Directions in DoS Mitigation:
In Table I, we summarize all the proposed DoS mitigation
mechanisms in terms of the entity implementing the mech-
anism, whether the attack model involves existent, dynamic,
or non-existent content requests, the nature of the mitigation
approach, the extra functionality needed in the routers, and the
level of collaboration required between routers. DoS attacks,
in general, either target the routers [21], [23], [24], [26], [29],
[30] and/or the content providers [22], [27], [31]. An attacker
tries to exhaust either the routers’ PITs or content providers’
resources by requesting dynamic or non-existent content with a
high rate, which causes unbounded service delays for legitimate
clients.
The majority of the proposed solutions [21]–[24], especially
against the interest flooding based DoS attacks, are variants
of a rate limiting mechanism on the suspicious interfaces or
name prefixes. The major drawback of the rate limiting based
solutions is that they may penalize legitimate clients also. No
scheme performs per-flow based rate-limiting, which has the
highest fairness. The closest is the approach by Gasti et al. [22]
where prefix based rate-limiting was proposed. There is need
for more fine-grained rate-limiting to better distinguish mali-
cious from benign requests.
Other proposed mechanisms including per-interest client’s
proof-of-work [31], fuzzy logic-based detection [30], statistical
hypotheses testing theory [26], and increasing the caching
time [27] have also been proposed to solve the problem. How-
ever, these mechanisms either require storage of per content
statistics at the routers or are not computationally scalable,
especially in the real time. A better mechanism may be one that
removes the suspicious requests from the PIT [29], similar to
the publish-subscribe Bloom filter based self-routing [9], [10].
This mechanism can be augmented by adopting a self-routing
approach for the suspicious interests and using the available
stateful routing for the legitimate interests.
Another potential direction is employing a software-defined
networking (SDN) approach in which a network controller
with an overall aggregated view of the network detects and
mitigates the DoS attack in its early stages. It can be achieved
by the collaboration of routers at different levels of the network
hierarchy, specifically for filtering the communication flows that
share malicious name prefixes. Exploiting a more sophisticated
interest aggregation method, which aggregates the malicious
interests with same prefix (regardless of their suffixes) into one
PIT entry, can also slow down the PIT exhaustion. We also
believe some of the current IP-based detection and defense
mechanisms [82] might be relevant for ICN DoS mitigation.
This is a significant area of interest.
An attacker can orchestrate a DoS attack in publish/subscribe
networks by manipulating the z-filter in a content packet.
This causes each intermediate router to forward the packet
to all of its interfaces, creating congestion in the network.
However, DoS attack in publish/subscribe networks has not
received much attention from the community, except the work
proposed by Alzahrani et al. [46], [47]. We believe that DoS
in publish/subscribe networks is a legitimate security concern,
which requires more in depth analysis and solutions.
All the proposed mechanisms try to address interest flooding
in CCN and NDN architectures. However, the rate limiting and
proof of work approaches can be applied to other architectures,
where the attacker targets the intermediate entities such as
DONA’s resolution handler and NetInf’s name resolution server.
B. Content Poisoning Attack
The objective of the content poisoning attack is to fill routers’
caches with invalid content. To mount this attack, an attacker
must control one or more intermediate routers to be able to
inject its own content into the network. The injected content has
a valid name corresponding to an interest, but a fake payload
or an invalid signature. This attack is applicable to all ICN
architectures, however, it is less effective in architectures using
self-certifying names. With self-certifying names the digest of
the packet’s content is the name of the packet. Thus it is easier
to verify the correctness of a content chunk by comparing the
hash of the chunk against the digest and drop packets whose
hash does not match.
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Fig. 5: Content poisoning attack scenario.
We illustrate The poisoning attack in Fig. 5. The attacker
is one of the routers on the path between the client and
provide returning an invalid content (oval C1) instead of the
genuine content (double-border rectangle C1) corresponding to
the requested name. This attack can have potentially devastating
consequences: unless the content are validated an attacker can
fill the network with poisoned content objects, while useful
content find no place in the caches.
Fig. 6 illustrates our categorization of content poisoning
countermeasures. The first category, collaborative signature
verification, refers to those mechanisms in which routers co-
operate with each other to verify the content signature. The
consumer dependent category includes those approaches that
either rely on using additional fields in request and data packets
or clients’ feedback. We start with the first category.
Content Poisoning
Collaborative
Signature Verification
[22], [32]
Consumer
Dependent
[33]–[35]
Fig. 6: Content poisoning countermeasure sub-classes and the
state-of-the-art.
1) Collaborative Signature Verification Countermeasures:
This category refers to the approaches that propose router
verification of signatures of packets they forward. To distribute
and reduce the load of signature verification, the routers flag
the verified chunks to signal their peers that the packet has been
validated, and/or verify the signature of the chunks upon cache
hit (only verify popular content).
Gasti et al. [22] were the first to discuss the content/cache
poisoning attacks. As their first countermeasure, the authors
suggested the use of a “self-certifying interest/data packet”
(SCID) to help routers validate received content chunks. Before
sending an interest, a client is required to obtain the desired
chunk’s hash, name, and signature from the content provider.
This information is attached to the interest. On obtaining a
content chunk, a router can check its validity by comparing
its hash to the hash from the interest information it has. This
method is less computationally intensive than traditional RSA
signature verification, however it requires the client to obtain
the hashes for each data chunk/packet beforehand and for the
routers to store them until verification. This increases content
retrieval latency and router storage overhed, thus limiting
scalability.
As an improvement, the authors proposed cached content sig-
nature verification by routers. In the basic version, each router
randomly selects and verifies content chunks, dropping those
whose signatures cannot be validated. To prevent redundant
verification, routers collaboratively select a range of content
chunks to verify. The scope of this collaboration can vary from
a neighborhood to an organization. To reduce collaboration
overhead, the authors also suggested client feedback based
decision-making in which a client may inform its edge router
about each content chunk’s validity. However, this type of
feedback can also be used by malicious clients to mislead
routers by reporting legitimate content objects as fake, or vice-
versa.
The mechanism proposed by Kim et al. [32] was inspired
by check before storing (CBS) [83], which probabilistically
verifies content items, only storing validated content items in
the cache. The authors measured that generally around 10% of
the cached contents are requested again before their expiration
from their caches. Hence, they divided the cache into serving
content, which will be requested while they are cached, and by-
passing content, which will be dropped from the cache before
subsequent interests.
The authors used a segmented LRU policy for cache re-
placement: a content is initially put in the by-passing content
segment of the cache. The proposed countermeasure only
verifies the signature of a serving content, that is a content
that has a cache hit. At that point the content’s signature is
verified and it is moved to the serving content cache segment.
To avoid multiple verifications of a chunk, the verified chunk
is marked in the serving content cache segment.
The authors simulations showed that the approach resulted
in a reduction in the number of poisonous content cached;
however, the scheme has some drawbacks. Any chunk that is
requested twice still needs to be verified, thus adding to the
latency and computation. An attacker can enforce verification
of every fake content, by requesting it twice; at scale this could
lead to a DoS/DDoS attack. The authors show that with an
increase in the serving content cache segment proportion the
overall content hit rate goes down. But they do not mention
if this reduction in hit-rate is for fake content or for usable
serving content; this could have a significant bearing on system
TABLE II: Content Poisoning Countermeasures are Classified to Collaborative Verification and Consumer Dependent Classes
Mechanism Mitigation Approach Overhead
Collaborative Signature Verification
Gasti et al. [22] Self-Certifying Interest & Collaborative Signature Verification Hash Value Comparison & Random Signature Verification
Kim et al. [32] Collaborative Signature Verification of Serving Content Signature Verification on Cache Hit
Consumer Dependent
Ghali et al. [33] Client Feedback, Content Ranking Content Ranking Calculation
Ghali et al. [34], [35] Interest-Key Binding & Adding the Provider’s Public key to the Content PPKD Comparison & Signature Verification
efficiency.
2) Consumer Dependent Countermeasures: In the con-
sumer dependent countermeasures, the clients either give feed-
back on the legitimacy of the received content or include
the providers’ public keys in their request packets to enable
verification. Ghali et al. [33] proposed a content poisoning
mitigation mechanism while introducing an updated definition
for fake content. The authors defined a fake content as one
with a valid signature using the wrong key, or with a mal-
formed signature field. The authors discussed the applicability
of existing solutions such as signature verification by interme-
diate routers, which is infeasible at line speed. On the other
hand, although self-certifying names are more efficient as a
countermeasure, issues such as efficient content hash retrieval
and handling of dynamic content objects need solutions. Hence,
the authors proposed a ranking mechanism for cached content
using exclusion-based feedback.
Exclusion is a selector feature in the CCN and NDN architec-
tures [84], which allows a client to exclude certain data (either
by hash or name suffix) from matching its interest, effectively
overriding a match on the requested name’s prefix. Clients can
use this feature to avoid receiving data objects that are known to
be unwanted, corrupted, or forged. In the proposed approaches,
a detector function ranks content based on three factors: number
of exclusions, exclusion time, and exclusion-interface ratio.
The exclusion time defines the recency of a particular data
name exclusion. A content goes down in rank if it has more
exclusions, a recent exclusion, or if the router receives exclusion
feedback for it from multiple clients on different interfaces. To
overcome poisoning, if a router has multiple cached contents
with names that match that requested in the interest, then the
router returns the highest ranked content.
The drawbacks of this approach are: it is highly dependent
on client feedback; non-cooperative and/or malicious clients
can undermine its effectiveness; storage of multiple copies of
same content undermines cache efficiency. Furthermore, the
exclusion feature is not present in all ICN architectures.
Ghali et al. [34], [35] noted that content poisoning mitigation
is contingent on network-layer trust management. According to
them, cache poisoning attack in ICN is due to interest ambiguity
and lack of a trust model. The former arises from the interest
packet structure, which considers the content name as the only
compulsory field, while neglecting two other fields, the content
digest and the publisher public key digest (PPKD). The latter
refers to the lack of a unified trust model at the network layer.
As a solution, the authors suggested to clarify interest
ambiguity by adding a binding between content name and the
provider’s public key, an Interest-Key Binding (IKB), to the
interest packet. The only modification at the content provider
is the addition of the provider’s public key to the content’s
KeyLocator field. An intermediate router, upon receiving a
content, matches the hash of the public key present in the
KeyLocator field with the interest’s PPKD (available in the
PIT). The content will be forwarded if these match, and will
be discarded otherwise.
The client-side complexity of this approach is in obtaining
the provider’s public key in advance. In order to bootstrap
a trust model, the authors proposed three approaches: a pre-
installed public key in the client’s software application, a global
key name service similar to DNS, and a global search-based
service such as Google. To reduce core routers’ workload, the
authors proposed that edge routers perform the IKB check
for all content packets, while core routers randomly verify
a subset of content packets. Nevertheless, this mechanism
does not scale. Signature verification, which is a public key
infrastructure (PKI) based verification, is slow and cannot be
performed at line speed, even if only some randonly chosen
routers or only edge routers perform the verification. Some
other weaknesses of the mechanisms proposed by the authors
include the assumption that the verifying router is trusted–
perhaps the router is malicious, then it can verify an incorrect
IKB to be correct [22], [33]–[35]. Further, the schemes lacked
detailed analysis of scalability and overhead.
3) Summary and Future Directions in Content Poisoning
Mitigation: Table II summarizes the basic techniques used
in the proposed countermeasures and their overheads. In this
attack, the attacker’s goal is to fill the routers’ caches with
fake contents, that are either content with valid names and
invalid payloads or content with invalid signatures. All of the
proposed mechanisms require the intermediate routers to verify
the data packets’ signatures [22], [32], compare the content
hash in interest and data packets [22], [34], [35], or to rank
the contents based on the clients’ feedback [33]. Signature
verification approaches suffer from delays, which undermine
scalability. The client feedback based content ranking approach
can be undermined by malicious clients.
We believe that the hash verification based approach is the
more promising approach on account of low amortized cost to
intermediate routers. More study need to be conducted to iden-
tify a suitable cryptographic hash function. Another approach
is to trace the fake content back to its origin by leveraging
the history of each interface on the route. After successfully
detection of the attack origin, a mitigation mechanism can be
orchestrated. For instance, a router may prevent caching the
content chunks that arrive from a suspicious interface or have
the same name prefixes as the fake content. We believe that
there is still need for more efficient and scalable mitigation
approaches.
C. Cache Pollution Attack
Caching in ICN is effective, especially if the universe of
on the Internet follows a popularity distribution (e.g., Zipf
distribution), where a small number of popular contents are
requested frequently, while the rest of the contents are requested
sparingly. The popular (frequently requested) contents can be
caches in the network, thus reducing request latency and net-
work load. However, an attacker can undermine this popularity
based caching by skewing content popularity by requesting less
popular content more frequently. This is the cache pollution
attack.
In this subsection, we explore two classes of cache pol-
lution attacks: locality disruption and false locality. In the
locality disruption attack, an attacker continuously requests
new, unpopular contents to disrupt cache locality by churning
the cache. In the false locality attack, on the other hand, the
attacker’s aim is to change the popularity distribution of the
local cache to favor a set of unpopular contentx by repeatedly
requesting the unpopular contents set. In principle, this attack is
feasible in all ICN architectures. However, in publish/subscribe
architectures (e.g., PSIRP and PURSUIT) the attack may have
minimal impact. The one-time subscription mechanism used
in publish/subscribe architectures means a subscriber cannot
artificially increase a content’s popularity by requesting it
multiple times.
Fig. 7 illustrates the cache pollution attacks categorization:
locality disruption and false locality. The attack countermea-
sures are further subcategorized according to their computation
overhead at the intermediate routers. We note that the approach
proposed by Karami et al. [39] addresses both locality disrup-
tion and false locality threats.
1) Locality Disruption Mitigation Approaches: In the pro-
posed approaches to mitigate locality disruption, the routers
either cache the content with certain popularity (attack pre-
vention) or have to periodically evaluate the popularity of their
cached content (attack detection). We subcategorized these pre-
vention and mitigation mechanisms based on their computation
overhead on the routers into high and moderate subcategories.
a) Approaches with High Computation Overhead: Sev-
eral proposed locality disruption mitigation approaches require
complex and iterative procedures per content caching decision
at intermediate routers, thus incurring high computation over-
head. For instance, Park et al. [36] proposed a cache pollution
detection scheme based on randomness check. The iterative
scheme takes advantage of matrix ranking and sequential analy-
sis for detecting a low-rate pollution attack: an attacker request-
ing chunks at a low rate to bypass any rate filters. The detection
scheme starts with the routers mapping their cached content
onto an n × n binary matrix M , where n ' [√Sc] and Sc is
the average number of cached contents. The authors employ
two cryptographic hash functions for mapping a content name
to location in the matrix and evaluate its rank M . The ranking
process is iterated k times, and the attack alarm is triggered
if the matrix-rank reaches a pre-defined threshold. Due to its
focus on low-rate attacks the scheme does not consider popular
contents, which are removed from consideration.
The authors showed the effectiveness of their scheme in
detecting low-rate locality-disruption attacks. However, this
scheme is not applicable to the harder to detect false locality
attack. Furthermore, the proposed approach is computationally
heavy for the caching routers.
Xie et al. [37] proposed CacheShield, a mechanism providing
robustness against the locality disruption attack. It is composed
of two main components: a probabilistic shielding function,
and a vector of content names and their corresponding request
frequencies. When a router receives a request for a content
chunk, if the chunk is in its CS, it replies with the content.
Otherwise, the router forwards the interest towards the provider.
When a chunk arrives at the router, the shielding function
defined as, 1/(1+e
p−t
q ), where p and q are pre-defined system-
wide constants and t denotes the tth request for the given
chunk, is used to calculate the probability of placing the content
in the CS.
If the chunk is not placed in the CS, then the router either
adds the chunk’s name with a frequency of one in the vector
of content names, if it does not exist; if the name exists,
then the frequency is incremented by one. A chunk is placed
in the CS when the request frequency of the exceeds a pre-
defined threshold. This approach suffers from the fact that the
shield function’s parameters p and q are constants and can
be easily deduced (if not known), and hence an attacker can
easily calculate the value of t. Then the attacker has to just
ensure that it requests the unpopular contents more than t times.
Additionally, the portion of the CS used to store the name vector
adds to the storage overhead.
b) Approaches with Moderate Computation Overhead:
There are other proposed approaches that use only a subset
of the content at a router to perform attack detection, hence
do not suffer from high overhead. For instance, to overcome
the shortcomings of CacheShield, Conti et al. [38] proposed
a machine-learning approach. They evaluated the impact of
cache pollution attacks on different cache replacement policies
and network topologies. They proposed a detection algorithm,
which operates as a sub-routine of the caching policy. The
algorithm is composed of a learning step and an attack-testing
step. It starts by checking the membership of an arrived content
in a sample set chosen from the universe of contents. If
the content belongs to the sample set, the learning step will
be triggered with the goal of identifying an attack threshold
(defined as τ ) for evaluating the contents.
The value of τ is used by the attack test sub-routine in
the testing step. The attack test sub-routine compares the
calculated τ with another value δm, which is a function with
parameters, such as content request frequency and the size of
the measurement interval, of all contents in the sample set. If
δm is greater than τ , then the mechanism detects an attack. The
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Fig. 7: State-of-the-art in cache pollution countermeasures.
TABLE III: Cache Pollution Countermeasures Classified to Locality Disruption and False Locality Classes
Mechanism Detection & Mitigation Approaches Attack Type Router’s OverheadStorage Computation
Locality Disruption
Park et al. [36] Cached Content Matrix Ranking Low-rate Locality Disruption Low High
Xie et al. [37] Probabilistically Caching Popular Content Locality Disruption Moderate High
Conti et al. [38] Random Content Sampling for Attack Threshold Detection Locality Disruption Low Moderate
False Locality
Karami et al. [39] Adoptive Neuro-Fuzzy Inference System Replacement Policy Locality Disruption & False Locality Moderate High
Mauri et al. [40] Honeypot Installation & Hidden Monitoring False Locality (by Content Provider) Moderate Low
drawback of this approach is that it only detects the attack, but
does not identify the attack interests, or content chunks. Further,
the assumption that the adversary’s content requests can only
follow a uniform distribution is simplistic and may not reflect
the reality.
2) False Locality Mitigation Approaches: The false locality
attack can be orchestrated by malicious consumers and/or
producers. A malicious consumers’ goal is to alter the content
popularity in the local caches, while malicious producers’ intent
is to store its content in the routers’ caches. As with the cache
pollution attack, we subcategorize the proposed countermea-
sures into high and low computational overhead.
a) Approach with High Computation Overhead:
Karami et al. [39] proposed an Adaptive Neuro-Fuzzy
Inference System (ANFIS) based cache replacement policy
resilient to cache pollution. The policy has three stages:
input-output data pattern extraction, accuracy verification
of the constructed ANFIS structure, and integration of the
structure as a cache replacement policy. In the first stage, an
ANFIS structure is constructed according to the properties of
the cached content. Variables such as a content’s time duration
in cache, request frequency, and standard deviation of the
request frequency, are all fed into a nonlinear system. The
system returns a goodness value between 0 and 1 per content
(0 indicates false-locality, 0.5 indicates locality-disruption, and
1 indicates a valid content).
The system iteratively evaluates the goodness of the cached
contents that have been cached beyond a predefined time
period. The system selects the contents with goodness values
less than a goodness threshold, ranks them, and applies cache
replacement over the content with low goodness values. The
authors showed the advantages of their proposed mechanism
over CacheShield in terms of hit damage-ratio (proportion
of hits that cannot occur due to the attack), percentage of
honest consumers receiving valid contents, and communication
overhead. However, this mechanism needs to store historical
and statistical information for each cached content–a significant
memory overhead. Additionally, the iterative computation of
statistics undermines scalability.
b) Approaches with Low Computation Overhead:
Mauri et al. [40] discussed a cache pollution scenario in NDN,
where a malicious provider intends to malign the routers’
cache to preferentially store its own content for lower latency.
The authors assumed that the provider used colluding terminal
nodes (bots or zombies) to request its content(s). This results
in a disproportionately larger portion of the attacker’s content
catalog to move down to the network edge, thus improving its
delivery latency. The authors proposed a mitigation mechanism
for this attack that used a honeypot installed close to potential
zombies, which monitors and reports the malicious interests
to the upstream routers. A router gathers these interests into
a blacklist; the interests in this blacklist are routed to the
provider using the standard NDN routing protocol, not the
CS or nearest replica. The proposed solution incurs low
computation overhead on the routers, however, it requires
additional infrastructure.
3) Summary and Future Directions in Cache Pollution
Mitigation: In Table III, we summarize the proposed cache
pollution solutions based on their detection and mitigation
approaches, and the nature of the attack. We also present
the storage and computation overheads for each solution at
the routers. Cache pollution is divided into false locality and
locality disruption attacks. The objective of these attacks is to
degrade cache effectiveness and increase the content retrieval
latency. Some of the proposed approaches [36], [37], [39]
incur high computation cost at the intermediate routers, which
TABLE IV: Secure Naming Approaches are Classified According to their Underlying Cryptographic Schemes
Mechanism Crypto Provenance Drawbacks
RSA Crypto
Wong et al. [41] RSA Pub. Key Digest PKG Requirement for Private key Generation
Dannewitz et al. [42] RSA Pub. Key Digest Lack of Evaluation & Scalability Issue
IBC Crypto
Zhang et al. [43] IBC IBC Signature Scalability Issue & Public key Length
Hamdane et al. [44] HIBC IBC Signature Signature Verification Overhead
undermines their scalability. Other proposed mechanisms either
only detect the cache pollution attack [38] or address the less
severe malicious provider attack scenario [40]. All the proposed
mechanisms except [40] can be applied to ICN architectures
that leverage caching.
We believe that the key aspect of a solution is in designing
a robust caching mechanism, which not only increases the
resiliency of the cache against these attacks, but also improves
the overall network latency and users quality of experience.
One possible direction is further exploration of collaborative
caching. Proposed collaborative caching schemes have aimed
at improving cache utilization and reducing latency [85]–
[87]. However, the positive impacts of collaborative caching
mechanisms on mitigating cache pollution attack have not been
explored. With collaborative caching and feedback between
the caches, mechanisms can be designed to contain or root
out cache pollution attack attempts. For instance, a coalition
of collaborative caches can exchange cache states and cached
content popularity to reduce caching of unpopular content [88],
[89].
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Fig. 8: The state-of-the-art in secure naming, routing, and
forwarding.
D. Secure Naming, Routing, and Forwarding
Content naming scheme (name schema) is an integral aspect
of ICN. In ICN, a verifiable binding between the content name
and its provider can help nullify attacks such as content poison-
ing. Secure naming is also essential for verifying provenance
of a content (an important feature of ICN). Secure routing
and forwarding on the other hand are essential aspects of any
network architecture. All three architectures we are discussing
(NetInf, Publish/Subscribe, and CCN/NDN) have their own
nuances in routing and forwarding, each leveraging their core-
features. In this subsection, we discuss the proposed security
enhancements on these routing and forwarding approaches.
Secure routing has been the focus of the NetInf and Pub/Sub
approaches while secure forwarding has been the focus in
CCN/NDN (NDN in particular).
Fig. 8 categorizes the proposed mechanisms into secure
naming, routing, and forwarding categories. The approaches
in the secure naming category are sub-categorized, based on
their underlying cryptographic schemes, to RSA-based and IBC-
based subcategories. As mentioned, we sub-categorize secure
routing and forwarding based on the underlying architectures.
1) Secure Naming: All the proposed naming schemes can
be easily categorized into either those that use RSA cryptogra-
phy and those that use identity-based cryptography. We follow
this categorization.
a) Approaches using RSA: The approaches using RSA
either use the provider’s public key or its digest to guarantee
content provenance. Wong et al. [41] proposed a secure naming
scheme to establish trust between content providers and clients.
The scheme uses a metadata composed of three identifiers:
authority identifier (ID), which is generated from the provider’s
public key; content identifier, which is the cryptographic hash of
the content; and algorithmic identifier, which binds the content
identifier with a set of the content fragment/chunk identifiers.
Based on the URI naming convention, the authority field is
mapped to the provider’s public key and the resource path
field holds the content identifier. The content metadata are
disseminated into a set of network nodes that function as part
of a domain name system and also store the metadata in a
DHT. For content retrieval, a client queries the DNS to resolve
the content name into a digital certificate. By extracting the
authority identifier from the certificate, the client obtains the
metadata that has to be resolved by the DHT. The query to
the DHT returns the content and algorithmic ID, which the
client uses to request the content. This approach suffers from
scalability concerns such as header overheads and the latency
due to DNS and DHT queries, which the authors have not
discussed.
In a similar vein, Dannewitz et al. [42] proposed a naming
scheme for NetInf. They proposed an information object (IO)
for each content as a tuple composed of the content ID, the
content, and a piece of metadata. The content ID follows a
self-certifying flat structure containing type, authentication, and
label fields. The type field specifies the hashing function used
for ID generation. The authentication field is the hash value
of the provider’s public key; and the label field contains a
number of identifier attributes and is unique in the provider’s
domain. The IO contains the provider’s complete public key and
its certificate, a signature over the self-certified data, and the
hash function used for the signature. This scheme has several
weaknesses: the IO field can be a big transmission overhead; the
signature verification if it happens per chunk can be expensive,
and if it happens after the whole content is downloaded can
enable cache poisoning or pollution attacks.
b) Approaches that Employ IBC Cryptographic Scheme:
In this subcategory the approaches use a binding between
the content name and the corresponding provider’s public
key. Zhang et al. [43] proposed a name-based mechanism for
efficient trust management in content-centric networks. This
mechanism takes advantage of identity-based cryptography
(IBC), in which either the provider’s identity or the content
name prefix is used as the public key. A trusted private key
generator (PKG) entity generates the private key corresponding
to the public key. For the content name prefix to be used as
the public key a name resolution service is required to register
the name prefix (for uniqueness).
Despite its advantages, use of IBC implies that PKI is still
needed to secure communication between the PKG and other
network entities. Additionally, the use of the content name
prefix as the public key is a new approach and needs further
investigation. Another significant drawback is the need for a
trusted PKG, which is another entity that needs to be added
into the system; which undermines usability.
Hamdane et al. [44] proposed a hierarchical identity-based
cryptographic (HIBC) naming scheme for NDN. This scheme
ensures a binding between a content name and its publisher’s
public key. The identity-based content encryption, decryption,
and signature mechanisms follows [43]. Different from the
previous work, the authors proposed a hierarchical model in
which a root PKG is responsible only for generating private
keys for the domain-level PKGs. The domain-level PKGs
perform the clients’ private key generation. This scheme has the
same scalability concerns as the previous scheme on account of
the encryption/decryption costs. In fact, the overhead is higher
as the size of the public key is longer and additively grows
with the depth of the hierarchy.
Table IV summarizes the existing secure naming schemes
and presents the type of cryptography used, the mechanism
for ensuring provenance, and the nature of the encryption
infrastructure. We note that the proposed naming schemes
have significant overheads. Reducing these overheads or at
least amortizing their cost over the complete set of inter-
ests/responses is an open research area.
2) Secure Routing: We categorize the proposed secure
routing schemes, according to their underlying architectures,
into secure routing in NetInf and Publish/Subscribe networks.
a) Approaches for Secure Routing in NetInf: Two ap-
proaches have been proposed to secure routing in NetInf. Both
aim to establish secure communication between public and
private domains (Rembarz et al. [45]). The first approach,
gateway-centric approach, uses a gateway to route all commu-
nications between the public and private networks. A publisher
in the private domain publishes a content to a private name
resolver, PNR, which resides in the private domain. The PNR
informs a public name resolver (NR) in the public domain,
about the published content’s identifier along with the gateway’s
location; instead of the actual publisher’s location. A public
subscriber resolves the content identifier at the public NR
and obtains the gateway address. The subscriber successfully
authenticates itself to the gateway for the gateway to resolve
the content identifier at the PNR and delivers the content from
the publisher to the subscriber.
In the second approach, the publisher in the private domain
publishes its private data identifier to a PNR. The PNR creates
a mapping between the content identifier ID and a generated
alternative identifier ID’ that is sent to the NR. A subscriber,
in the public domain, contacts the NR to resolve ID’ to
its location. The authentication happens at the PNR. This
mechanism removes the gateway, a single point of failure, in the
first approach. However, the PNR’s computation and communi-
cation overhead for subscribers authentication and authorization
(especially when the private network serves large amounts of
requests) undermines the scalability of this approach.
b) Approaches for Secure Routing in Publish/Subscribe:
The proposed approaches for secure routing in
publish/subscribe (pub/sub) networks focus on designing
DoS-resistant self-routing mechanisms and key management
approaches that prevent malicious publishers from generating
fake routes. Alzahrani et al. [46], [47] proposed a DoS-
resistant self-routing mechanism using Bloom filters. In
pub/sub networks, each network link is assigned a unique
identifier (LID), which is represented in the form of a Bloom
filter. When a network entity requests for a path from the client
to the content location (publisher or a cache), an entity called
the topology manager (TM), resident in one or more routers,
generates a filter (z-filter) that specifies the delivery path from
a publisher to the subscriber by OR-ing the Bloom filters
(LIDs) of the links on the delivery path. At the intermediate
routers, an AND operation between the z-filter (in the packet
header) and the routers’ LIDs on the path identifies the
delivery links.
This mechanism is vulnerable against DoS attack. An at-
tacker can collect enough z-filters and reuse them to overload
the frequently used delivery path(s) with bogus traffic. As
a remedy, the authors suggested the use of temporal link
identifiers that become stale after a pre-defined time period.
This temporal, per-flow z-filters was designed to restrict the
attacker’s impact. The remedy introduces two drawbacks; first,
the number of z-filter updates increases with a decrease in
the time interval–a trade-off between attack mitigation and
computation overhead at the TM. Second, the size of the packet
header (includes the z-filter) increases with the number of links
in the delivery path. The authors also investigated factors that
affect the z-filter’s size in [48].
Alzahrani et al. [49] proposed a key management protocol
for publish-subscribe networks which utilized dynamic link
identifiers. Following up on [46], [47] the authors proposed
an enhancement that prevents a malicious publisher from gen-
erating fake z-filters by enabling the publisher’s edge router
to verify the TM generated z-filter. Fake z-filters can enable
the transmission of a large number of packets aimed at over-
whelming unwitting subscribers. The TM shares a symmetric
key with the publisher’s edge router and uses it to crypto-
graphically hash the corresponding z-filter and it’s generation
timestamp, and forwards both to the publisher. The publisher
adds these information to each packet that it forwards towards
the subscriber. The proposed mechanism is vulnerable against
the malicious publisher colluding with its edge router. In
addition, this mechanism requires stateful routers, which are
vulnerable against DoS attacks (similar to CCN/NDN DoS-
flooding attack).
Fotiou et al. [67] reviewed a clean-slate PSIRP network-
ing architecture and highlighted its security assurances. The
architecture employs self-certifying names, each composed of a
rendezvous identifier (RID) and a scope identifier (SID). To pre-
serve information security, content transmissions are encrypted
and include packet-level authentication (PLA): packet header
contains the sender’s signature, public key, and certificate.
The forwarding mechanism utilizes a z-filter generated by the
topology manager to define the information delivery path. As
already discussed, z-filters suffer from scalability and false
positives. Apart from that, the use of per-packet cryptographic
signatures in PLA makes line-speed operations difficult.
3) Secure Forwarding: The secure forwarding category
includes mechanisms that either secure the forwarding plane
or create a secure namespace mapping, which allows interest
forwarding for name prefixes not in the routers FIB tables.
Yi et al. [50] augmented the NDN forwarding plane to
thwart security problems, such as prefix hijacking and PIT
overload (cases of authenticated denial of service). In prefix
hijacking, an attacker announces the victim’s prefix and drops
the interest. The authors suggested the use of interest NACKs
whenever requests are not satisfied for reasons, such as network
congestion, non-existent content, and duplicate content. The
interest NACK helps reduce the size of the PIT on account of
the NACK removing a PIT entry. Additionally, it mitigates the
prefix hijacking vulnerability, by providing extra time for the
router to query other faces for a content match. However, this
requires each router to store RTT information for each interest–
a significant overhead for core routers. Additionally, with the
NACK consuming an interest in the PIT, there is no scope for
bogus interest aggregation; this could exacerbate interest based
DoS attacks.
Afanasayev et al. [51] proposed a secure namespace mapping
scheme, which allows interest forwarding for name prefixes
that are not in the FIB—useful to handle node mobility. The
proposed mechanism is built upon two main concepts: link
object and link discovery. The link object is an association
between a name prefix and a set of globally routable prefixes.
By creating and signing a link object, the content owner maps
its own name prefix to those globally routable prefixes. The
authors designed an NDN based DNS service (NDNS), where
the mapping between the name prefix and the globally routable
prefixes are stored, and the service provides this mapping to a
requesting entity.
For link discovery, a client queries the NDNS iteratively for
each component of the requested name prefix. If a client sends
an interest that a router cannot satisfy using its FIB, that router
returns a NACK. After the NACK reaches the client, its local
forwarder discovers and validates the link object corresponds
to the name prefix. After that, the client embeds the link object
in its original interest and forwards it to the network. Although
this scheme is a good initial solution to provider mobility it
suffers from overheads. When a provider moves, the current
routable prefix, which is in the FIB of the routers, will results
in interests being routed to the provider’s former location until
the FIB entries time out; a waste of bandwidth in high traffic
scenarios.
Table V summarizes the proposed secure routing and for-
warding approaches and presents the architecture, the ob-
jective of the proposed mechanism, and solution to that
problem. Among the proposed mechanism, the work by
Afanasayev et al. [51] is the most important as it has addressed
the producer mobility; an open challenge in the ICN commu-
nity.
4) Summary and Future Directions in Secure Naming,
Routing, and Forwarding: The proposed approaches for secure
naming and routing in the ICN architectures are a good first
attempts to address the malicious attacks possible. A content
naming scheme with a verifiable binding between the content
name and its provider is essential to nullify attacks such as
content poisoning attack and is integral to ICN. However, in
all proposed approaches [41]–[44] this binding comes at the
high cost of signature verification (complete verification of
binding requires signature verification of each chunk), which
would prevent intermediate routers from verifying signature of
all arriving packets to maintain line speed. There is still a need
for more scalable and computationally efficient approaches.
The identity based cryptographic approaches [43], [44] require
the client to trust a third party for private key generation; a
practice that significantly undermines the applicability of these
TABLE V: Secure Routing and Forwarding Approaches are Classified with Regard to the Architectures
Mechanism Architecture Objective Proposed Solution
Secure Routing
Rembarz et al. [45] NetInf Secure inter-domain communication Name Resolution Service & Gateway redirection
Alzahrani et al. [46], [47] Pub/Sub DoS resistant Bloom Filter-based routing Employing temporary link identifier for z-Filter Generation
Alzahrani et al. [49] Pub/Sub Malicious publisher with fake z-Filter Publishers edge router validates z-Filters in data packet
Fotiou et al. [67] Pub/Sub Identity-based Authentication for DoS mitigation Each router validates signature, routing using z-Filter
Secure Forwarding
Yi et al. [50] CCN/NDN Prefix Hijacking & PIT Overload Employing NACK Packet for Unsatisfied Interest
Afanasayev et al. [51] CCN/NDN Secure Namespace Mapping Associating a Name Prefix to Globally Routable Prefixes
Application-level
Security
Request Filtering
[52], [53]
Anomaly Detection
[54], [55]
Security
Suites
Cyber-Physical
Architecture
[56]–[58]
Application-layer
Security
[59]–[61]
Trust & Integrity
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[62]–[65]
Fig. 9: Application-level security sub-classes and the state-of-the-art.
approaches.
A secure and efficient naming scheme is still an open
challenge. Any such scheme should include metadata, such
as the content hash and the provider’s identity and signature
for enhanced security. For instance, a potential secure naming
approach can be signature of the manifest (includes chunk
names and hashes) by the content provider. This is currently
an important area of research with proposals being made to the
ICN Research Group, an Internet Research Task Force [90].
On the other hand, secure routing and forwarding (and
routing and forwarding in general) do not perform acceptably
consumer and/or producer mobility. Even though this has not
appeared in the literature, employing Bloom filter based routing
(z-filter) in pub/sub networks leads to a potential routing attack.
Unless the Bloom filter is authenticated by an intermediate
router, an attacker or a malicious router can easily modify the
bits in the filters to either overload the network or disrupt con-
tent delivery. Developing efficient mechanisms to help routers
validate the integrity and authenticity of the z-filters needs more
research focus.
E. Application-level Security
We have classified the works in ICN application layer secu-
rity into three major subtopics: filtering, anomaly detection, and
security suites. Fig. 9 illustrates our categorization and the sub-
categorization within the categories followed by a mention of
the corresponding state-of-the-art. The filtering category deals
with the identification and removal of unwanted content, such
as spam, forged content, and content from untrusted publishers
at the application layer. Anomaly detection includes the detec-
tion of undesired activities, such as flooding, misbehavior of
network elements, and malicious traffic.
We have designated application-specific security measures
as security suites, which combine different cryptographic tech-
niques to achieve specific goal(s). We sub-categorize the mech-
anisms in security suites into it cyber-physical architecture,
application layer security, and trust and integrity model. The
cyber-physical architecture subcategory deals with the proposed
ICN-based architectures for smart grid, smart home, and In-
ternet of things. The application layer security, reviews the
security applications for ICN, such as secure email, covert
channel, and information sharing. The trust and integrity model
subcategory include the proposed mechanisms that build trust
in the network.
1) Request Filtering: The state-of-the-art in request filtering
either utilizes content ranking or exploits providers’ informa-
tion, such as public keys and name prefixes, to block spams
and blacklisted content. Fotiou et al. [52] proposed an anti-
spam mechanism for publish/subscribe networks. It is based
on an inform-ranking process, with content ranked based on
votes from publishers and subscribers. Each publisher serving
a content implicitly votes for that content. After the content
is published, it is voted on by subscribers. After the votes are
collected, they are used to rank the content objects and identify
spam objects.
Simulations showed that the mechanism filters spams better
than other existing schemes, which only consider the publisher
votes for ranking. However, this scheme’s reliance on user
feedback may counteract its effectiveness. Not only are typical
users unlikely to vote on the content, but malicious users can
hijack the voting process. Moreover, the voting process itself
confers non-negligible communication overhead.
Goergen et al. [53] designed a semantic firewall for content-
centric networks. Unlike IP firewalls, which filter at flow-level
granularity, the proposed firewall can filter content based on
provider and/or name. For provider-based filtering, the firewall
used provider’s public key to identify disallowed providers
and filter contents with invalid signatures. For content-name
filtering requests with blacklisted keywords in the name are
filtered. Both types of filtering can be performed on either
interests or the content chunks.
Additionally, the firewall could monitor for abnormal behav-
ior on each of its interfaces and filter abnormal peers (e.g., high
request volume or high drop rate). A minimalistic evaluation
showed that the firewall’s latency increases slowly with an
increase in the number of filtering rules. However, latency and
scalability in the face of large number of content chunks or
large content universe has not been analyzed.
2) Anomaly Detection: Most proposed anomaly detection
mechanisms aim to detect abnormal behaviors by using clas-
sification or fuzzy logic algorithms on routers statistical infor-
mation. Goergen et al. [54] proposed a mechanism for CCN to
detect attack patterns based on the activities of the FIB, PIT,
and CS. To detect abnormal behavior, each node periodically
evaluates per-second statistics, such as bytes sent/received,
content items received, and interests received, accepted and
dropped. The mechanism uses a support vector machine (SVM)
to classify a particular time period as either anomalous or
benign. The results show the efficacy of this method for attack
detection; however, its ability to detect low-rate attacks is
questionable. Furthermore, the computation cost of SVM at
the network elements may be prohibitive; a software-defined
networking based approach may be a good direction to explore.
Karami et al. [55] proposed a combined Particle Swarm
Optimization (PSO) meta-heuristic, k-means clustering, and a
fuzzy detection algorithm for CCN to classify normal/abnormal
behaviors. The fuzzy approach is notable for its low false-
positive rate; however, at the cost of an increased false-negative
rate. An attacker with sufficient resources can produce a large
amount of traffic to ensure its malicious packets get through
the system without detection.
3) Security Suites: Here we discuss the several security
suites proposed for ICN architectures based on our categoriza-
tion: cyber-physical architecture, application layer security, and
trust and integrity model.
a) Cyber-Physical Architecture: This subcategory in-
cludes ICN inspired communication architectures for cyber-
physical system, such as the Internet of Things (IoT) and
smart grid networks. Burke et al. [56] presented a security
framework for a CCN-based lighting control system. In the
first variation of the protocol, control commands required a
three-way handshake and were transmitted in a signed content
payload; in the second, the commands were immediately sent
as a signed interest. The framework uses an authentication
manager to manage the network’s PKI, and employs shared
symmetric keys for communication. To reduce the burden of
key storage on the embedded devices, these symmetric keys can
be generated on-demand by a pseudorandom function. These
shared symmetric keys can then be used to enforce encryption-
based access control.
The authors in [57] employ a similar architecture for secure
sensing in IoT. The system uses a trusted authorization manager
(AM) to generate the root keys, which are used to sign other
keys used. The AM associates a producer with a namespace,
which is listed in the producer’s certificate. Each sensor is also
assigned an access control list, which specifies the permissions
of each application with respect to that node. While this scheme
is flexible, it suffers from a significant overhead problem—
power-constrained devices such as sensing nodes are required
to perform asymmetric-key cryptography.
Vieira and Poll [58] proposed a security suite for C-DAX,
an information-centric Smart Grid communication architecture.
The proposed security suite employs content-based cryptogra-
phy, in which content topics are used as public keys, and the
corresponding secret keys are generated by a security server.
For each topic, write-access secrets and read-access secrets
must be distributed to each authorized publisher and subscriber,
respectively. While the scheme provides sufficient security and
flexibility for typical applications, its reliance on a central
security server constitutes a single point of failure. In a high-
impact critical infrastructure such as the Smart Grid, the failure
or compromise of this service could have dire consequences.
Also, requiring cyber-physical devices to store two keys for
each topic limits scalability.
b) Application layer Security: This subcategory includes
secure ICN-based application layer protocols, such as se-
cure email service, covert channel, and information sharing.
Saleem et al. [59] proposed a distributed secure email service
for NetInf, based on asymmetric-key cryptography. Each email
message is treated as an independent object. A client (user)
is identified by its public key, and no domain name service is
required thus providing scalability. However, the subscription-
based nature of the service potentially leaves users vulnerable
to spam, and no mitigation for this has yet been proposed.
Ambrosin et al. [60] identified two different ways of creating
an ephemeral covert channel in named-data networking. The
sender and receiver require tight time synchronization and
agreement on a set of unpopular contents to exploit. To send a
“1” covertly, the sender requests an unpopular object during
a time slot; to send a “0,” no request is sent. In the first
variation, the object is assumed to be cached at the edge
router if it was requested. The receiver then requests the same
content, and measures the retrieval time to differentiate a cache
hit from a cache miss, and consequently infers the bit that
was sent. This mechanism is accurate when the sender and
receiver are collocated behind the same edge router; therefore,
its applicability is limited.
Asami et al. [61] proposed a moderator-controlled informa-
tion sharing (MIS) model for ICN, which provides Usenet-like
functionality while leveraging identity-based signature scheme.
Several message groups are defined, each of which is assigned a
moderator. To publish a message in a group, the publisher signs
with its secret key then sends it to the group moderator. The
moderator can then sign the message and relay it to the group’s
subscribers, or reject the message and drop it. To verify a
signature, the subscriber only needs to know the identities of the
publisher and moderator. This is an example of implementation
of a secure legacy application in ICN.
c) Trust and Integrity Model: This subcategory focuses
on directions, such as dedicated security plane, self-certifying
names to real-world identities binding, and trust schema cre-
ation. Wong et al. [62] proposed a separate security plane
for publish/subscribe networks for assuring content integrity.
The security plane takes over the distribution of authentication
materials and associated content metadata from the data plane.
The materials distributed by the security plane would include
the content name and ID, the Merkle tree root, the publisher’s
public key, and the publisher’s signature. To prevent the inser-
tion of malicious metadata, publishers identify themselves to
the security plane and submit to a challenge-response authen-
tication. We believe that while it is convenient for data to be
separated from its authentication materials, a separate control
TABLE VI: Categorization of Application Security approaches
Mechanism Application Approach
Filtering
Fotiou et al. [52] Anti-spam mechanism Information ranking based on publishers and subscribers votes
Goergen et al. [53] Semantic firewall Filtering by content name, provider’s public key, and anomaly detection
Anomaly Detection
Goergen et al. [54] Traffic anomaly detection at routers Statistical data analyses and SVM classification
Karami et al. [55] Anomaly detection mechanism Fuzzy detection algorithm and traffic clustering
Security Suites
Cyber-Physical Architecture
Burke et al. [56] Lighting control system Submitting commands as signed content or signed interest
Burke et al. [57] Secure sensing in IoT Assigning a sensor an ACL for content publishing
Vieira et al. [58] Security suite for Smart Grid Content-based cryptography and access level distribution via security server
Application-Layer Security
Saleem et al. [59] Secure email service Asymmetric crypto with emails as independent objects
Ambrosin et al. [60] Ephemeral covert channel Time difference analysis between cache hit and cache miss
Asami et al. [61] Moderator-controlled information sharing Publisher signature followed by moderator signature for message publications
Trust and Integrity Model
Wong et al. [62] Content integrity by security plane Content signature and publisher authentication to security plane
Seedorf et al. [63], [64] Self-certifying names and RWI binding Employing a Web-of-Trust
Yu et al. [65] Trusted data publication/consumption Schematized chain-of-trust
plane is ultimately unnecessary. The integrity assurances can
be provided by implementing simple content-signing schemes,
such as the manifest-based content authentication supported by
CCN or NDN [1].
Seedorf et al. [63], [64] proposed a mechanism for binding
self-certifying names and real world identities (RWIs) using a
Web-of-Trust (WoT). A WoT is a directional graph, in which
nodes (users) are identified by an RWI-public key digest pair.
Edges represent trust relationships: an edge from a node u to a
node v indicates that v’s certificate has been signed by u. User u
trusts another user v if there exists a path starting at u, reaching
v in the WoT. Although this mechanisms is very useful in
infrastructure-less networks (e.g., disaster response networks)
it may suffer from inefficiencies based on the size of the WoT
graph, graph updates in the event of network segmentation, and
inaccuracies based on the basic notion of a trust chain.
Yu et al. [65] presented a schematized trust model for
named-data networks to automate data authentication, signing,
and access procedures for clients and providers. The proposed
model is composed of two components: a set of trust rules,
and trust anchors. Trust rules define associations between data
names and the corresponding keys that are used to sign them.
The authors define a chain of trust, which is discovered by
recursively evaluating trust rules, starting from the KeyLocator
field in the content and ending at a trusted anchor. Anchors are
envisioned to serve as trusted entities that help bootstrap the
key discovery process. For data authentication, the client uses
the public key in the KeyLocator of the packet and according
to the trust schema, recursively retrieves public keys to reach
a trust anchor to verify the content.
The iterative discovery and key verification step may become
inefficient for mobile or IoT devices that are power constrained.
Further the trust rules may become complex quickly within a
few levels, thus requiring a mechanism for automatic creation of
the trust chain in an application. The scheme will have limited
applicability until then.
4) Summary and Future Directions in Application Secu-
rity: Table VI summarizes the proposed application-level mech-
anisms. The table contains the proposed approaches reference,
the corresponding application, and the approach’s information.
We note that several interesting applications have been consid-
ered in the ICN domain.
Different ICN security applications and application-level
security mechanisms, such as content filtering, anomaly detec-
tion, and covert channel have been proposed in the literature.
Mechanisms proposed in [52]–[55] attempt to detect abnormal
traffic at the intermediate routers, spam contents based on the
subscribers’ and publishers’ votes, or performed content filter-
ing through the firewall. In [56]–[58], the authors proposed ICN
inspired architectures for lighting control systems, Internet of
things, and the smart grid. In [65], Yu et al. proposed a chain-of-
trust based schema for content publishers and consumers to use
to share content. The authors in [62] suggested the separation of
data and security planes for better content integrity assurance.
Other proposed applications include ephemeral covert channel
communication [60], secure email service [59], and moderator-
controlled information sharing [61].
We have not found an application that incorporates all the
security functionalities available in ICNs (any architecture) nor
did we find a comprehensive application-level security suite
(again for any architecture). That should be one of the interests
of future researchers in this domain.
3. PRIVACY IN ICN
In this section, we explore privacy risks in ICNs and the
proposed mitigation mechanisms. Privacy attacks in ICN may
target the routers, cached contents, content names, content
signatures, as well as client privacy. These privacy concerns
are applicable to all architectures. Additionally, a few attacks
are possible due to the inherent design choices of specific
architectures; we discuss them separately. We will highlight
the vulnerable design choices and discuss their advantages and
disadvantages.
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Fig. 10: Privacy Risks and their Countermeasures.
Fig. 10 presents our categorization of privacy attacks in ICNs,
along with the proposed mitigation mechanisms. We categorize
privacy attacks into timing attack, communication monitor-
ing attack, censorship and anonymity attack, protocol attack,
and naming-signature privacy. In timing and communication
monitoring attack (Subsections 3.A, 3.B), the attackers probe
the cached content of a router over time to identify content
popularity in the cache or requesters content access behavior.
In Subsection 3.C, we discuss the proposed approaches for
anonymous communication. The protocol attack subsection
(Subsection 3.D), reviews the vulnerable design features of an
architecture, such as longest prefix matching and the scope
field. The name of a content in ICN and its signature by
design ties the content to the producer’s identity, which raises
concerns of producer (publisher) privacy. In Subsection 3.E, we
discuss the privacy concerns from this exposure and review the
literature on publishers privacy.
Before discussing the state of the art based on these cat-
egories, we mention one work that is general, and hence
goes across several of the above categories, hence merits a
standalone definition. Fotiou et al. reviewed the proposed ICN
architectures and discussed the privacy requirements and design
choices for secure content naming, advertisement, lookup, and
forwarding in [109]. The authors classified each privacy threat
as either a monitoring, decisional interference, or invasion
attack. The decisional interference attack either prevents a
consumer from accessing certain content, prevents the content
advertisement and forwarding of a specific provider, or allows
content filtering based on content name. In the invasion attack,
an attacker tries to acquire sensitive information from the target.
The authors also analyzed the identified threats and ranked them
according to the DREAD model [110], and briefly reviewed
ongoing research on privacy concerns in information-centric
networking. Now, we discuss the categories.
A. Timing Attack
Timing attack has been explored in a large body of litera-
ture [6], [91]–[94]. In a timing attack, an attacker probes content
objects which it believes are cached at a shared router. The
attacker leverages precise time measurements to distinguish
cache hits and cache misses, and thereby can identify which
contents are cached. A cache hit implies that the content had
been requested by another client in the neighborhood, while a
cache miss indicates that the content has not been requested
(or has been evicted from the cache). An informed attacker
can also ascertain whether the request is served by the provider
or by a router somewhere along the path to the provider. As
illustrated in Fig. 11, a shorter latency in retrieving content C1
in comparison to content C2 reveals the availability of C1 in
the shared edge router’s cache.
We note that this attack, although feasible in all architectures
employing caching, is less effective in the pub/sub architectures.
In pub/sub (specifically PSIRP/PURSUIT), when a node sub-
scribes to a publisher’s content, the latencies of the initial packet
deliveries (already created and potentially cached packets) can
be used to see whether the packet came from a nearby or farther
cache publisher. The timing of subsequent (newly generated)
packets do not reflect caching latencies as they are disseminated
by the publisher and multicast into the network, and may not
even be delivered from a cache.
C1
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Client
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Attacker
Edge  router
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Fig. 11: Timing attack scenario.
1) Timing Attack Mitigation Approaches: Acs et al. [91]
investigated cache privacy in CCN/NDN networks in the pres-
ence of timing and cache probing attackers. They confirmed the
effectiveness of these attacks in different network topologies,
and demonstrated attack feasibility even when the attacker and
the victim are three hops away from a shared router (success
rate of 59%). They discussed two traffic classes: interactive
traffic and content distribution traffic. For interactive content,
the authors proposed the addition of a random number to the
content name; the number is mutually agreed upon by the
TABLE VII: Summary of Timing Attack Mitigations
Acs et al. [91] Mohaisen et al. [93], [94] Chaabane et al. [6]
Approach Delay for the first k interests Delay for the first interest from each client Delay for the first k interests
Mitigating Entity Edge routers Edge routers & access points Edge routers
Granularity Per content Per client per content Per content
requester and the content provider. This prevents the attacker
from successfully probing the cache for this content if the
precise content name matching approach is employed.
However, this approach does undermine caching–cached
content can no longer be reduced. As an alternative solution, the
authors suggested that the requester and producer mark privacy-
sensitive interests and content as private. The intermediate
routers do not cache these marked content, thus preventing
privacy leaks. The authors also suggested the emulation of
a cache miss at a router, with the router applying a random
delay before satisfying a content chunk request. But, a delay
undermines user’s quality of experience (QoE).
The authors reduced the impact on QoE by using a popularity
threshold. The premise of the model is that the privacy-sensitive
contents are usually unpopular, and that increased popularity
generally results in reduction of the privacy need. With this
addition, the router randomly delay satisfying a content for the
first k-times it is requested, and deliver the content as soon as
possible for the subsequent requests. This model reduces the
latency for popular contents, but clients experience the extra
delay for the first k-interests and this mechanism also requires
extra state for maintaining the number of requests.
In [93], [94], Mohaisen et al. took a similar approach as
above and proposed three variations of a mitigation technique
for the timing attack. In the vanilla approach, an edge router
fetches content chunks from the provider and stores the retrieval
times for the corresponding first interests. The router also tracks
the interest frequency of each requested privacy-sensitive con-
tent chunk. Each first interest for a cached content chunk from
a new client (one who has not requested that content before)
will be satisfied with a delay same as the recorded retrieval
latency for the chunk. Clearly, the per-client state needed to be
stored means that this approach will not scale with increasing
number of clients. To reduce the storage requirements, a second
approach proposed that the edge router stores only per-interface
interest retrieval time history. Although this approach reduces
state size, it also increases the potential of success of timing
attack for an attacker on the same interface.
The last variation solved the shortcomings of the first two
through cooperation between the access points/proxies and
their corresponding connected edge routers. Here, the access
point stores per-client state; and the router stores only per-face
statistics. The decision to apply random delay is made by the
router with the help of the downstream access point. The access
point flags the interest from a new client to inform the router.
The router delays the data reply for the flagged interests. We
believe that despite the strengths of this scheme, the use of
random delays goes against one of the core principles of ICN–
leverage caching to reduce latency.
In [6], Chaabane et al. also proposed applying a delay–either
on all requests for cached content, or on the first k-requests
only–for mitigating timing attack. They also briefly discussed
collaborative caching and random caching, to preserve cache
privacy. Collaborative caching increases the anonymous clients
set by increasing the number of clients that share a set of
routers; thus it implicitly helps to preserve privacy. The authors
provided no analysis of the caching approaches. We believe
collaborative caching is a good direction for further exploration.
2) Summary and Future Directions in Timing Attack
Mitigation: Table VII summarizes the proposed solutions to
the timing attack. We present the referenced work, the proposed
solution, and the entity in the network where the mitigation
procedure is executed. We have not mentioned [92] as the
authors have not really presented a mitigation strategy.
The majority of the proposed timing attack mitigation mech-
anisms [6], [91], [93], [94] apply an artificial delay during con-
tent forwarding, which makes them applicable to all architec-
tures. Despite the effectiveness of this approach in misleading
the adversary, it undermines the advantage of latency reduction
due to caching. Another negative impact of this approach is
degradation in clients’ QoE, especially for the popular content
objects.
One natural approach of coping with timing attack is de-
signing an efficient collaborative caching mechanism, which
not only increases the anonymity set of the clients but also
improves system performance and reduces overall content re-
trieval latency. Moreover, this precludes the need for artificial
delays. Chaabane et al. [6] have made an initial attempt in this
direction. Network coding techniques can also be leveraged to
design a secure and efficient content dissemination model by
coding and dispersing the chunks.
B. Communication Monitoring Attack
In the communication monitoring attack [6], [95], [96], an
attacker has access to the same edge router that the victim
receives content from (similar to timing attack). However, here
an attacker targets a specific victim and tries to identify the
victim’s requested contents; this is different from timing attack
where the goal is to identify contents popularity. The attacker
may know the victim’s content consumption habits or specific
characteristics, which differentiate the victim from other clients
(e.g., language, region, or institutional affiliation).
1) Communication Monitoring Attack Mitigation Ap-
proaches: Lauinger et al. [95] proposed two types of request
monitoring attacks under the stationary content popularity
model with a constant request rate, employing non-invasive and
invasive cache probing, respectively. The stationary popularity
assumption states that the content popularity distribution does
not change over large time periods, and the interest for a content
is independent of previous interests. In the non-invasive cache
probing model, the authors assumed that the attacker’s requests
do not change the router’s cache state. The attacker (with
prior knowledge of the victim’s interests) frequently probes the
shared router’s cache.
The unrealistic assumption in the non-invasive model that
the cache probing does not change the content popularity leads
to the proposal of the invasive cache probing attack model. In
the invasive model, a cache miss caused by the attacker at the
shared router causes the requested content to be cached, hence
the attacker needs to differentiate cache hits from cache misses.
The authors also proposed a model for calculating the attacker
cache-probing frequency.
The mitigation approaches proposed for monitoring attacks
have been similar to that of the timing attacks. The authors
in [95], [96] proposed selective caching, in which a content will
be cached only if it reaches a specific popularity threshold. This
is congruent with the assumption that privacy risk decreases as
content popularity increases. Alternatively, a client can ensure
privacy by establishing a secure tunnel with either the content
provider or a trusted proxy [100], [103]. Another solution
relies on the trustworthiness of the ISP to honor a client’s
request by not caching a content that is marked as privacy-
sensitive by a provider. However, these approaches work under
the assumptions that the ISP is trustworthy and the privacy-
sensitive content are unpopularity, which may not always be
valid assumptions.
Chaabane et al. explored attacks against content privacy
in [6]. The authors introduced the monitoring and censorship at-
tacks resulting from information exposure from caching routers.
To cope with content privacy issues, the use of secure tun-
neling with symmetric/asymmetric encryption (like SSL/TLS).
However, secure tunneling undermines the utility of caching,
increasing core network load and content retrieval latency.
As an alternative solution, the authors proposed broadcast
encryption and proxy re-encryption, which in turn suffer from
significant communication and computation overhead. Also, it
is common knowledge that even with data encryption, monitor-
ing of encrypted communication can leak information through
traffic analysis.
In [92], Compagno et al. proposed a method to geographi-
cally localize a client To mount this attack, the attacker uses
several distributed hosts (zombies or bots) to request contents
that they suspect a victim(s) may request. The aim is to identify
corresponding cache or PIT hits. Precise time measurements
and complete knowledge of the network topology and several
other network properties are important in this attack. The
authors noted that this attack is only effective when the victim
requests unpopular content–a popular content is requested by
many and hence monitoring a few entities is difficult. Although
the study is interesting, the assumptions especially about com-
plete network knowledge is strong and not practical. Also, the
authors present no countermeasure.
2) Summary and Future Directions in Communication
Monitoring Mitigation: Solutions to this attack disable caching
of sensitive content either by creating a secure tunnel [100],
[103] or with the clients flagging the requests as non-cacheable
for privacy [95], [96]. These solutions are applicable for all
ICN architectures. However, we believe that undermining net-
work’s caching capabilities is not a desired solution–it increases
communication complexity and cost. Although we agree that
secure tunneling is a viable approach, we believe an efficient
tunneling mechanism should be designed, which at least allows
partial content caching. Another direction to research is naming
scheme randomization [97], which would make content-name
prediction difficult for attackers. If manifests are used (metadata
to create chunk names), they can contain encrypted information
on how to request the random chunks, which only a legitimate
client can decrypt. The requirement of decryption will also
serve as an attack deterrent in general. Strengthening the
vulnerable architectural features, such as scope, exclusion, and
prefix matching would help reduce the attack scenarios for
the affected schemes. Of course, they come at the expense of
efficiency resulting from these features.
C. Anonymity and Censorship Mitigation
As in other networks, anonymous communication is impor-
tant in ICN as well. Lack of anonymity may reveal critical
information about the clients and the requested contents, which
could be used to enable censorship. Unlike in IP networks, in
ICN the packet carries the name of the content requested. The
name in the interest (be it a human readable name, a hashed
string, or a self-certifying name) can be used by an intermediate
router to filter and drop it. The name can also be used by
the first-hop router or proxy to censor the clients. As depicted
in Fig. 12, an on-path adversary monitors the client’s interest
and compares the requested content name against its contents’
blacklist for censorship. A match results in the request being
dropped–an effective censorship mechanism.
The exposure of the content name, and the semantic binding
between the name and the content itself, raise new privacy and
censorship concerns. Several anti-censorship mechanisms have
been proposed in the literature [97], [99]–[103]. As it is illus-
trated in Fig. 13, we categorized the proposed mitigation mech-
anisms into non-proxy-based and proxy-based categories. The
non-proxy-based mechanisms employ steganographic and/or
encryption to provide privacy. In the proxy-based category,
consumers interact with a proxy that is responsible for the client
and name privacy (by creating encrypted proxy-client tunnels).
Content  Name:  /facebook.com
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/facebook.com
/Youtube.com
Client
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Content  router
Content  router
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Fig. 12: Censorship risk due to lack of anonymity.
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Fig. 13: Anonymous communication and censorship mitigation
approaches are categorized into whether they use a proxy or
not.
1) Non Proxy-based Mechanisms: The anti-censorship
mechanisms we discuss under non-proxy-based category either
employ steganographic techniques to obfuscate content names
or use ephemeral identities and homomorphic cryptography to
enhance clients privacy. Thus, we categorize these approaches
into steganographic and encryption subcategories.
a) Mitigation Employing Steganography: In schemes that
employ steganography, the objective is to obfuscate the content
chunks’ names, thus increasing the computational complexity
of deciphering the chunks’ names for the attackers, who are
unaware of the name generation schemes. Arianfar et al. were
one of the first to study this problem [97]. They proposed a
name obfuscation scheme in which the content provider uses a
secret cover file–a random file of the same size as the content.
The provider splits the content and the cover into same sized
blocks and runs an exclusive-or operation on all combinations
of k (≥ 2) blocks of the content and the cover to create the
corresponding encoded content chunks that are then published
into the network. The name of an encoded chunk is the hash
of the hashes of the names of the corresponding content and
cover blocks respectively.
Utilizing a secure back channel, the provider sends each
verified requesting client the necessary metadata, such as the
content hash, the content’s length in blocks, the corresponding
cover blocks, the names, and the name generation algorithm.
Using this meta-data the client generates the chunk names,
requests them from the network, and deciphers them. Although
the chunks and their names are publicly available, an adversary
cannot decipher the content without the metadata; and it is
computationally expensive to break the scheme to decipher the
chunk names.
The size overhead of the scheme is significant. The cover
file represents a 100% overhead, and must be transmitted via
a secure back channel for each client–not scalable. In fact, if
a secure back channel exists, that can be used to send the file
itself.
b) Mitigations Employing Encryption: Approaches em-
ploying encryption either exploit temporary identities or lever-
age homomorphic cryptography to prevent client identity-based
interest filtering. Elabidi et al. [98] proposed a privacy protec-
tion scheme, which enforces identity expiration. The system is
composed of identity providers, trust verification providers, and
digital identity protection authorities in addition to the standard
network elements. The scheme provides users with ephemeral
identifiers (by identity providers), which they communicate to
the service providers. The service providers authenticate the
users through a trust verification provider. The trust verification
provider informs the digital identity protection authority when
an ephemeral identity is used after its expiration. Though this
design provides the useful “forgetfulness” property for the
identities, a malicious service provider could disable access or
filter requests from users by corrupting the ephemeral identities
and preventing access for clients. Other issues with this scheme
include need for several entities and the requirement of user
authentication by a third-party service, which raise concerns of
overhead and availability.
Fotiou et al. [99] proposed a mechanism to preserve con-
tent lookup privacy by leveraging homomorphic cryptogra-
phy [111]. The scheme involves cooperation between providers,
clients, and a hierarchical brokering system–a tree of brokering
nodes. A provider publishes its content identifier to the broker-
ing system, which disseminates the identifier-provider pair to
the leaf brokering nodes. To locate a content, a client submits
an encrypted query to the root broker node. By employing
homomorphic cryptography, the query can be resolved by the
brokering system without decryption. When the content is
found, the client will be sent an encrypted response containing
a pointer to the desired content provider.
In this scheme, a query includes a vector of sub-queries
corresponding to the nodes in the brokering system. Each
broker using its part in the sub-query to forward the query to its
children recursively until the content is identified. A big pitfall
of the mechanism is it requires 2h−1 decryption operations to
locate a content at level h in the tree-hierarchy. In addition,
considering the number of messages transmitted per query, the
system scales poorly in the face of an increasing number of
clients and contents.
2) Proxy-based Mechanisms: In proxy-based approaches,
a client needs to interact and share a secret with a proxy
(a network of proxies). The proxy is responsible for de-
crypting/decoding clients’ requests, retrieving the requested
content, and returning the encrypted/encoded content to the
clients. The approaches are similar in spirit to the popular
Tor (The onion routing protocol–the popular anti-censorship
tool for IP networks). Based on how the layered-encryption is
performed, we categorize the proposed proxy-based approaches
into encryption-based and coding-based.
a) Encryption based Mitigation: ANDaNA [100], a
tunneling-based anti-censorship protocol, uses two proxies–
one proxy adjacent to the requester, and another proxy closer
to the destination–to create a tunnel with two layers of
encryption. By using ANDaNA, a client decouples its identity
from its request. The first proxy is only aware of the client’s
identity (but not the content name), while the second proxy can
only identify the requested content (not the client’s identity).
The interest travels unencrypted between the second proxy and
the provider. The authors proposed an asymmetric version of
TABLE VIII: Summary of the Proposed Mechanisms for Anonymous Communication and Censorship Mitigation
Mechanism Approach Infrastructure Computation Complexity
Non Proxy-Based Approaches
Steganography
Arianfar et al. [97] Encoding interest by mixing content and cover file Not Applicable High (cover & exclusive-or)
Encryption
Elabidi et al. [98] Ephemeral identities for users Requires three new entities High (several interactions)
Fotiou et al. [99] Hierarchical DNS based brokering model Brokering Network High (homomorphic cryptography)
Proxy-Based Approaches
Encryption
DiBenedetto et al. [100] TOR based model – 2 layers of encryption Two Proxies Moderate (symmetric key)
Chung et al. [101] TOR based model – 2 layers of encryption Two Proxies Moderate (symmetric key)
Coding
Tao et al. [102] Random linear network encoded interest One Proxy Moderate (RLNC + PKI)
Tourani et al. [103] Huffman encoded interest One Proxy Low (Huffman coding)
the protocol where the two-layers of encryption are performed
using the proxies public keys, with the packets decrypted by
the proxies using their private keys. The content on its way
back is encrypted using symmetric keys shared by each proxy
with the client.
Due to the high cost of the PKI operations, the authors pro-
posed a symmetric key based session-key model to replace PKI
operation. Despite ANDaNA’s usefulness as an anti-censorship
tool, it induces significant delays in content delivery (ref. results
in [100]) in comparison to Tor.These delays are caused, in part,
by the process of setting up the secure channel.
In [101], Chung et al. took a similar approach to ANDaNA
and Tor. In this approach, the client encrypts the interest
packet with two symmetric keys that will be shared with two
Anonymous Routers (ARs). The interest’s encryption order
follows the onion routing model. Different from conventional
onion routing, an identifier (a hash of the content name) is
embedded in the encrypted interest to enable cache utilization
(i.e., CS-lookup) and interest aggregation (PIT lookup) at the
first AR. The provider transmits the content to the closest
(second) AR in plaintext. The content response on the way back
may be cached on the second AR, which encrypts the content
and forwards it to the first AR. The first AR decrypts the content
for caching before re-encrypting it and forwarding it towards
the client. Similar to ANDaNA, this scheme suffers from the
same high cost of multiple per-packet encryptions/decryptions.
b) Coding based Mitigation: Unlike encryption-based
anti-censorship approaches, the mechanisms in coding-based
category employ coding techniques, such as random linear
network coding and Huffman coding to protect clients pri-
vacy. In these mechanisms, a client only needs to interact
with a single proxy, which performs interest and content
encryption/decryption. Tao et al. [102] proposed a mechanism
leverages ICN’s inherent content chunking in conjunction with
random linear network coding (RLNC). To request a content
chunk, the client splits the interest into small chunks and
encrypts a linear combination of the chunks with the public
key of an intermediate trusted proxy. The proxy, after receiving
enough interest chunks, reconstructs the original interest packet
and sends it toward the content provider. The content provider
follows the same approach as the client, splitting the content
into small chunks and forwarding a linear combination of them
towards the proxy. The two major concerns of this proposed
scheme are a lack of cache utilization and the high cost of
many asymmetric-key cryptographic operations.
Tourani et al. [103] addressed the ICN censorship problem,
by proposing a client anonymity framework that leverages
the prefix-free coding technique. In their proposed design,
each client shares a unique Huffman coding table with an
anonymizer, which may be collocated with the content provider
or an intermediate trusted router. The client encodes the content
chunk’s name postfix (part of the name after the domain
name) using its Huffman coding table, leaving the domain
name in plaintext, to be used for routing. The authors also
proposed ways to encode the whole name (when the domain
is also censored) with the help of network entity, named the
anonymizer.
When an encoded interest reaches the anonymizer, the name
is decoded and the interest with the unencrypted name is
forwarded to the content provider. The content provider sends
the content chunk in plaintext to the anonymizer (caching can
be leveraged on the path), which then encrypts the content
name and forwards it to the client. The routers between
the anonymizer and the provider can identify the content,
but cannot identify the requester, while the routers from the
anonymizer to the client cannot identify the name, thus preserv-
ing client privacy. The paper did not have a trade-off analysis
between cache utilization and privacy preservation, and did
not discuss the scope of potential differential cryptanalysis
attacks. However, it is one of the approaches with the least
overhead/latency.
3) Summary and Future Directions in Anonymity and
Censorship Mitigation: Table VIII summarizes the existing
anonymous communication mechanisms and presents their in-
frastructure requirements and computation complexities. Note
that the technique proposed by Tourani et al. has the lowest
computation complexity and infrastructure cost. Some of the
existing anti-censorship solutions [100]–[103], have achieved
anonymous communication through secure tunneling, where the
content is encrypted between the providers/proxy and clients.
Other approaches include a name obfuscation scheme [97] and
a hierarchical brokering network [109] for anonymous content
retrieval. Expensive cryptographic operations [97], [100], [101],
requirement for a secure back channel [97], and undermining
of in-network caching [100], [102], [103] are the main pitfalls
of these mechanisms. Except the work by Fotiou [109] that
targets architectures with brokering network (e.g., PSIRP and
PURSUIT), other proposed solutions (e.g., tunneling, name
obfuscation, and network coding based mechanisms) are ap-
plicable to all ICN architectures.
There are some potential directions for future research on
cache utilization optimization and reduction in the cost of
cryptographic operations. Applying cryptographic operations
on a subset of content chunks to reduce cost has not yet
been explored. Exploiting low-complexity network coding tech-
niques [102], [103] instead of traditional cryptography would
be a good idea to expand the applicability of tunneling schemes.
This is especially important given that the majority of devices
in the future will be resource-constrained devices (e.g., mobile
devices, Internet of Things, etc.).
D. Discovery and Protocol Attacks
Discovery and protocol attacks are a result of intrinsic design
features of CCN and NDN architectures (only applicable to
these architectures). Some examples of these features are the
interest packet scope field and the name-based matching used in
NDN. Fig. 14 illustrates a discovery attack, in which an attacker
probes all caches in a two-hop locality for content with prefixes
/abc and /XYZ. In this subsection, we review two of the articles
that addressed the pitfalls of these design features.
The authors in [95], [96] introduced an object-discovery
attack, which abuses NDN’s [7] prefix matching and exclusion
pattern features. The attacker employs the prefix matching
feature to probe for all cached content objects under a par-
ticular name prefix starting at the root of the namespace,
say /www.google.com/, and iteratively exploring it by using
interests with exclusions and forcing intermediate routers to
walk through the namespace. With the exclusion feature an
attacker can discover the whole namespace (quickly for small
namespaces) and also the names of cached content (additional
monitoring attacks).
Chaabane et al. [6] also defined two protocol attacks based on
prefix matching and scoping respectively. The prefix matching
attack works as described by Lauinger et al. [95]. In the
scoping attack, an attacker probes all the available content
objects in nearby caches by leveraging the scope field in the
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Fig. 14: Protocol attack scenario.
interest packet. By carefully selecting the scope, the attacker
can identify the content available in individual routers, thereby
breaching the privacy of other clients. However, no solution has
been proposed for these attacks except for the removal of the
enabling features.
1) Summary and Future Directions in Discovery and
Protocol Attacks: The use of prefix matching, exclusions, and
the scope field are examples of features that can be attacked
in some ICN architectures to probe for popular content objects
and explore the content namespace. Prefix-matching feature is
useful for legitimate clients with limited knowledge of their
desired content name (e.g., when only a prefix of the content
name is known). The scope field can also be employed by a
legitimate client who would like to obtain a content only in
the case that it is available in a nearby cache. Therefore, these
features should not be completely eliminated from ICN, but
instead should be redesigned with these threats in consideration.
Potential solutions may be the use of rate-limiting requests for
a specific namespace, similar to what is done by DNS servers
today. We believe that there is a need for a comprehensive
analysis, both analytical and experimental, of these features to
identify their trade-offs.
Developing mechanisms to help routers to validate the in-
tegrity and authenticity of the z-filters needs research focus.
E. Name and Signature Privacy
Unlike the current Internet, several ICN architectures require
the content to be explicitly requested by name. In ICN, names
either follow a hierarchical human-readable or a self-certifying
flat-name model. We refer readers to a survey on ICN naming
and routing [75] for more details. In the human-readable nam-
ing convention, the content name exposes information about the
content and the provider due to the inherent semantic binding.
Name & Signature
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Name Obfuscation
[6], [104], [105]
Overlay Network
[106]–[108]
Fig. 15: Naming and signature privacy sub-classes and the state-
of-the-art in censorship.
Fig. 15 illustrates our categorization of the literature in name
and signature privacy starting with two broad categories: name
obfuscation and overlay network. The proposed approaches in
name obfuscation try to enhance name privacy by switching
from the human-readable naming to machine-readable naming
convention. In the overlay category the approaches use an
overlay network in conjunction with a name resolution service
to securely map the real identities to digital identities.
1) Name Obfuscation: The proposed name obfuscation
use machine-readable naming schemes, which are generated
by content digest, Bloom filter, and the use of ephemeral
TABLE IX: Summary of the Proposed Approaches to Augment Name and Signature Privacy
Mechanism Approach Advantage Drawback
Name Obfuscation
Baugher et al. [104] Cryptographic Content Hash-based Naming Easy Authentication-Provenance Not Suitable for Dynamic Content
Chaabane et al. [6] Bloom Filter-based Naming & Group Signature Increased Publisher Privacy Bloom Filter Size & False Routing
Katsaros et al. [105] Employing Ephemeral Names Increased Publisher Privacy Undermine Caching
Overlay Network
Martinez et al. [106], [107] Digital Identity in an Overlay Network Privacy for Real Identities Additional Infrastructure
Sollins [108] Overlay Network with Identifier Resolution Service Privacy for Real Identities Lack of Compatibility Analysis
names. Cryptographic hash based naming was motivated by
Baugher et al. [104]. The main advantage of such self-verifying
names (names are cryptographic hash of the content) is the low
cost of content authentication. In these schemes, a client obtains
a content’s (or chunk’s) self-verifying name from a catalog that
maps contents from their human-readable names to their hashes.
The client stores the hashed name for future use and submits a
request for the content corresponding to the hashed name into
the network. It accepts the retrieved content if its cryptographic
hash matches the self-verifying name from the catalog. This
mechanism can also be used to preserve the privacy of the
provider.
The authors noted that hash-based naming is only useful
for read-only, cacheable data objects. Additionally, the use
of the catalog to obtain self-verifying names requires the
establishment of trust between clients and the catalog publisher,
which requires creation of trusted infrastructure in the network
a potential overhead.
Chaabane et al. in [6] discussed the privacy concerns em-
anating from the semantic correlation between the human-
readable names and the content/provider identity, including
potential leaks from digital signatures. They suggested the
use of one Bloom filter for each name in the hierarchy to
represent names without correlating with the content. To pro-
tect publisher privacy, they proposed different schemes such
as confirmer signature, group signature, ring signature, and
ephemeral identity. All of these solutions, except ephemeral
identity, achieve signature privacy by increasing the cardinality
of the anonymity-set of signers. Under ephemeral identity,
frequently changing temporary identities used by a publisher
prevent an attacker from identifying the publisher based on
its signature. However, the probabilistic nature of Bloom filter
and potential for false-positives may cause false routing and
incorrect interest to content-chunk mapping. Furthermore, the
size of the Bloom filters could be large and the lookup latency
will increase with increasing levels in the name hierarchy.
Katsaros et al. also investigated ephemeral names for con-
tent to improve publisher privacy [105]. Despite the benefits
of using ephemeral names for content providers, temporary
naming undermines the network’s caching capability. Contents
with ephemeral names will expire and will be purged from
the caches, hence they will not be available to meet clients’
requests; this is especially true for popular content.
2) Overlay Network: This category of secure naming lever-
ages an overlay network in which entities are associated with
identities that are only known in that domain. The overlay
network uses a name resolution service to map the entities
to their identities. Martinez et al. [106], [107] proposed such
as scheme for privacy and untraceability. Each network entity
(users, machines, services, hardware) is associated with a
digital identity and a domain. Each domain is equipped with
a Domain Trust Entity (DTE), which manages entity-identifier
associations and identifier authentication. The DTEs form an
interconnected infrastructure, which facilitates identity-based
communication. For two entities to establish a communica-
tion channel, the first entity authenticates itself to the DTE
infrastructure and submits a query seeking the other. The DTE
infrastructure processes the query and returns the identifier
of the other entity. The identifiers are used to establish a
secure tunnel through the DTEs. Although this overlay network
preserves the entities’ identities, the network’s security can be
undermined by compromised DTEs, which themselves form
additional network infrastructure.
Sollins [108] discussed the design issues with names in ICN
and proposed an overlay naming system for content identifica-
tion. The naming system uses the scope of the ID space (local,
global), the ID syntax (size, structure, character set), and the ID
structure (flat, hierarchical, composite). In addition, identifier-
object mapping requires the existence of a naming authority
to enforce ID lifetime and uniqueness and a name resolution
system. The author designed a Pervasive Persistent Object ID
(PPOID), based on the principles of layering and modularity.
With PPOID, a human-readable identifier is mapped into an
ID space, which resolves to an ICN identifier. Simple and
expressive user-friendly identifiers at the top layer are mapped
onto machine-readable identifiers for real-time resolution and
delivery. However, the author did not discuss the applicability
of this naming system to the existing popular ICN architectures
and challenges.
3) Summary and Future Directions in Name and Signa-
ture Privacy: Table IX summarizes the proposed mechanisms
for preserving name and signature privacy. We present the
referenced work, their approaches to augment the naming
and signature privacy and their advantages along with their
drawbacks. The proposed approaches for name and signa-
ture privacy include overlay-based network [106]–[108], self-
verifying names [104], and hierarchical Bloom filter based
naming [6]. The drawbacks of the overlay-based models is
their dependency on trusted entities and additional latency for
resolving content names. The proposed hierarchical Bloom
filter naming approach [6], suffers from false positives. The
self-verifying naming approach [104] is only applicable to read-
only content, not to dynamic contents, which are generated
upon request. For dynamic content no catalog can be generated
ahead of time.
We believe an efficient approach in this context could be
for the provider and the user to cloak their identities by
using several certificates to map to several identities and using
the identities at random. This is similar to the k-anonymity
mechanism used to create an anonymity-set for an identity.
4. ACCESS CONTROL IN ICN
In this section, we explore the proposed access control (AC)
enforcement mechanisms for ICNs. The unique characteristics
of ICN, such as name based routing and in-network caching
make AC management more important. By design most ICN
architectures are requesting host agnostic. Thus, once content is
disseminated in the network it can be cached and disseminated
by network routers to satisfy requests without the routers
checking if the requesting entity can access the content. This
in turn could lead to content providers losing control over who
accesses their content. Researchers in the domain have recently
started exploring this problem.
As depicted in Fig. 16, we categorize the-state-of-the-art in
ICN access control based on whether they use a particular
encryption technique or are independent of the underlying en-
cryption used as encryption-based and encryption independent
categories. The encryption-based category is further subdivided,
based on the type of encryption into broadcast encryption,
PKI, attribute-based, and identity-based subcategories. The en-
cryption independent category presents approaches that present
AC frameworks that can use any encryption algorithm for
performing AC. We discuss these categories in more details
in what follows.
A. Encryption-Based Access Control
All proposed encryption-based approaches are conceptually
similar–the content providers encrypt their content before dis-
seminating them into the network. Clients need to authenticate
themselves and obtain the content decryption keys to be able
to decrypt and consume the content.
1) Broadcast Encryption Access Control: Broadcast en-
cryption allows a content provider to encrypt its content using
a single key for all clients; the clients use their individual keys
to decrypt the content. It also allow efficient revocation of
the clients (without content re-encryption). A secure content
delivery framework, which waives the necessity of an online
authentication service was proposed by Misra et al. [112],
[113]. The framework uses the (n, t)-Shamir’s secret sharing
based broadcast encryption to enforce AC. The framework’s
strength is that it needs no additional authorization entity nor
incurs extra computational overhead at the routers.
For secure content delivery, the provider encrypts the content
with a symmetric content encryption key and disseminates
it into the network. In addition, the provider generates and
disseminates a small amount of keying material (called enabling
block, EB, and containing t-key shares) into the network. Only
authorized clients can use the EB and their individual keys to
decrypt the content encryption key and decrypt the content after
that. The EB is requested by the client along with the content,
and is cacheable.
Client revocation is achieved by updating the EB by the
replacement of one of the key shares with the revoked client’s
share, which disables the revoked client from decrypting the
symmetric key. In this mechanism, the EB is an overhead
(minor for large contents, but significant for small ones).
The EB update on client revocation also consumes network
bandwidth.
2) PKI-Based Access Control: As shown in Fig 17, we
categorize the PKI-based mechanisms into session-based, proxy
re-encryption, and probabilistic subcategories.
a) Session-Based Access Control: The state-of-the-art in
session-based AC suggests establishment of a secure session
between a client-provider pair after client authentication and
authorization. Within a secure session, the client can request
content from the provider. Renault et al. [114], [115] proposed
a session-based access control mechanism for NetInf. This
mechanism requires a security controller, collocated with each
content storage node, to check the access rights of clients. A
client and the security controller establish a secure channel and
exchange public keys using the Diffie-Hellman key exchange
protocol, thus requiring no additional infrastructure.
The client requests a content using the content ID and its
own public key (the public key may be omitted for publicly
available content). On receiving a client’s request, the security
controller performs challenge-response with the client to verify
the client’s identity. Upon verification, the controller checks
whether the client is authorized to access the content before
forwarding the data; revocation can happen at this point. The
interactions take place in a secure session; the session ends if
either party explicitly requests its termination.
The main drawbacks of this scheme are: the cache between
the client and the controller is effectively unusable and the need
for the secure tunnel between the controller and the client for
the duration of communication. The authors discussed the secu-
rity of this mechanism against several well-known attacks, how-
ever they did not explore the potential for DoS/DDoS attack. A
client can open one/more idle connections with the controller
and exhaust the resources. Also, this connection-oriented set-up
is antithetical to the connectionless ICN paradigm.
Wang et al. [116] designed a current IP-like session-based
AC mechanism. The authors illustrated their design using the
example of an online social network (OSN). A user registers in
the OSN (content provider) by sharing a symmetric key and its
credentials with the OSN service. Upon registration, the OSN
provides a unique ID for the user. The client logs in to interact
with the OSN. It generates a new symmetric key and sends it
to the OSN along with the login information. The OSN then
assigns a session ID to the client and stores a tuple consisting
of the session ID, the client ID, and the new key.
To upload content, a client needs to be authorized first. After
authorization, the client encrypts the content with the previously
shared symmetric key, then forwards it to the OSN along with
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its desired AC policy. The OSN decrypts the content and re-
encrypts the content with a newly generated symmetric key.
Other clients request the content using its public name (obtained
from a search in the OSN or a search engine). The OSN,
authorizes the client and its access to the content and returns the
content’s secure network addressable name, the symmetric key
to decrypt the content, and the required metadata encrypted with
the requester’s session key. The requesting authorized client
decrypts the message and requests the content by the secure
name. To prevent the public name-secure name correlation and
access by revoked clients, the OSN changes the secure name
at regular intervals.
This scheme undermines the potency of in-network caching
as renaming a popular content effectively invalidates it in the
cache. It also results in a content existing under several names
in the network, which violates the ICN’s principle of content
name immutability. Also, content access overhead is high given
that the process has to be repeated for each content.
b) Proxy Re-Encryption-Based Access Control: In proxy
re-encryption-based AC, a piece of information is re-encrypted
by an intermediate proxy (a third party or an intermediate
router) for each client. Wood et al. [117] proposed a flexible
mechanism for secure end-to-end communication, leveraging a
combination of proxy re-encryption and identity-based encryp-
tion. The content provider encrypts content using a symmetric
key before dissemination. A client may obtain a content from
either a cache or the content provider. Upon receiving the en-
crypted content, the client requests the symmetric key from the
content provider. The provider validates the client’s legitimacy
and access level and sends the symmetric key to a validated
client, encrypted with the client’s identity. The client extracts
the received key and decrypts the content.
The proposed scheme reduces the cost of cryptography as
only the symmetric key is encrypted individually for each
client, the content is not. However, contact with the content
provider is required with each request, even if the content can
be retrieved from a cache. This undermines content availability
in the case of the provider’s unavailability.
Mangili et al. [118] proposed a framework for AC and
track-ability in which content is broken into partitions and
further into fragments allowing two layers of encryption by
providers. A provider encrypts the fragments into a chunk using
a symmetric key that will be stored in the encrypted chunk.
In the second-layer of encryption, used for confidentiality and
collusion prevention, a key-chain is generated using the “key-
regression” key derivation algorithm [135]. An authenticated
consumer regenerates the second-layer key by using a secret
obtained from the provider. To prevent collusion, the provider
encrypts the first-layer encrypted chunks with different second-
layer keys (per user or group of users keys), which will be
generates only for authorized clients.
On client revocation, the provider generates a new second-
layer key and publishes the re-encrypted data. The framework
requires caching routers to regularly query the provider for
newly encrypted chunks to replace the old ones. Despite
leveraging in-network caching, clients are required to perform
per content authentication at the providers; requiring always
online providers. Furthermore, legitimate clients may end up
with fragmented sets of chunks with each fragment of chunks
encrypted with a different key. This would require a client to
download all the corresponding keys and identify which key
decrypts which fragment.
Zheng et al. [119] proposed an AC mechanism which re-
quires edge routers to perform content encryption. The process
starts with the publisher encrypting the content with its public
key and a random key k1. Upon a client’s request for a content,
the edge router selects a random key k2, and re-encrypts the
encrypted content (as in proxy re-encryption). The random
key k2 is encrypted by the publisher’s public key and signed
by the edge router, and is attached to the content to be sent
to the client. To decrypt the content, the client sends the
encrypted k2, the content name, and its identity to the publisher.
The publisher validates the client’s identity and access level
and upon validation uses its private key, along with k1 and
k2 to generate the content decryption key k for the client.
Upon receiving k, the client may decrypt the content. Due
to the randomness of the k2 generated with each request, the
decryption key k will be different for each client.
The performance analysis in the paper shows that the edge
router’s re-encryption operation takes about 10 seconds for a
small content (256MB). The need to use edge routers’ resources
for encryption undermines the scalability of this solution,
especially since the majority of the future Internet traffic is
expected to consist of large multimedia content.
c) Probabilistic Access Control: In the probabilistic AC,
the network is equipped with Bloom filters for storing the
authorized clients’ public keys. The intermediate routers use
these Bloom filters to block unauthorized requests, which helps
reduce clients’ authentication cost. Chen et al. proposed a
probabilistic structure for encryption-based AC in [120]. Pub-
lishers and clients are equipped with public-private key-pairs,
and each client initially subscribes to a publisher by sending
an interest. The publisher stores a record for each registered
client, noting the client’s credentials. For efficiency the authors
suggested PKI-bootstrapped symmetric key exchange between
the publisher and the client. The content requested by the
client is delivered encrypted. After receiving the content, the
client authenticates itself to the publisher to securely obtain the
symmetric decryption key.
The authorized clients’ public keys are put into a Bloom
filter, which is transmitted to network routers to allow them to
filter invalid requests. The interest of a client whose public key
is not indexable in the content’s Bloom filter is dropped. Al-
though this procedure reduces network load, the recommended
client revocation incurs costly content re-encryption and distri-
bution. The approach has two other drawbacks: Bloom filter’s
suffer from false positives–an unauthorized client’s request can
be satisfied with a small probability. The size of the filters could
rise rapidly with increasing number of clients. Second, is the
need for authentication of the client at the publisher to obtain
the symmetric key. This requires an always-online publisher (or
another entity) to verify client credentials, which is difficult to
guarantee.
3) Attribute-Based Access Control: In attribute-based AC,
a content is encrypted with a set of its attributes. Each client is
assigned a key, generated from the client’s set of attributes. The
client can consume the content if she can use her attributes to
decrypt the content-access policy, which is either embedded in
the encrypted content or the decryption key. Ion et al. [121]
proposed an attributed-based encryption (ABE) mechanism
for AC enforcement that used either the key-policy or the
ciphertext-policy based encryption models.
In the key-policy model, the content is encrypted with a
key derived from the content attributes, and the access policy
is embedded in the decryption key. A key authority grants
different decryption keys to clients, based on their attributes
and access policies. In the ciphertext-policy model, the AC
policy contains the required client attributes and is attached to
the encrypted content. The key authority issues a key for each
client, in this case derived from the client’s attributes. Attribute
and identity based encryption mechanisms require elaborate
revocation procedures. The authors did not describe the process
of client revocation, and did not analyze the performance and
efficiency of revocation in the scheme.
Li et al. [122], [123] used attribute-based encryption for
access control enforcement in ICN. In the proposed scheme, a
trusted third party defines and manages the subject and object
attributes by creating attribute ontology for each (ontology in
this context is the universe of all attributes). As the cached
contents are available to all users, to prevent unauthorized
access, the authors proposed a naming scheme, which preserves
the privacy of the AC policy. To publish a content, the publisher
generates a random symmetric key with which it encrypts the
content. The encrypted content, along with its corresponding
metadata, is disseminated into the network.
The publisher also generates an AC policy from the attributes
defined by the trusted third party; the access policy then
defines which clients are authorized to access the content. The
publisher uses the AC policy to encrypt the symmetric key,
which encrypts the content. This encrypted symmetric key is
the content name. A client needs to retrieve the content name
(possibly through some kind of domain name service) and
extract the symmetric key using its attributes (only possible
by an authorized client). Despite its low overhead, the appli-
cability of this scheme is questionable due to the proposed
naming scheme; the content name is generated by encrypting
the symmetric key with the AC policy. Compromise of the
symmetric key would necessitate re-keying and hence change
the content name, which undermines the spirit of immutable
naming in ICN. Also, client revocation remains a challenge.
Da Silva et al. [124] proposed an AC mechanism using
attribute-based encryption for instantaneous access revocation.
The authors suggested the use of Ciphertext-policy ABE, in
which the access policy, generated by the provider, is embedded
inside the encrypted content. The content is encrypted with the
required authorization attributes, which are stored in content
routers. Each content has an access policy, which is stored at
a proxy. Only the proxy can decrypt the access policy.
When the client registers with the application, it receives a
key (based on its attributes) and an ID. For content retrieval, the
client sends two interests: the first one retrieves the encrypted
content (from the publisher or a cache), and the second, which
includes the client ID and the content name, is sent to the
proxy to decrypt the access policy. The proxy authenticates the
client and decrypts the access policy on the client’s behalf; this
decrypted policy is forwarded back to the client without being
cached in the network. The client can decrypt the content if its
attributes satisfy the access policy retrieved from the proxy. In
order to perform immediate revocation, the publisher notifies
its proxy of each revoked client. Because each client should
be authenticated by the proxy for access policy decryption,
the proxy can deny access to the revoked clients. The main
drawback of this mechanism is its requirement for the third-
party authentication by the proxy–a single point of failure that
needs to be always online.
Raykova et al. [125] proposed authentication-based AC for
pub/sub networks using distributed trust authorities, which play
the roles of certificate and authorization authorities. Before
publishing a content, a publisher protects the payload using
the ciphertext-policy ABE. Only a subscriber with the required
attributes may decrypt the ciphertext. In the pub/sub network,
broker nodes match the published content to the subscriber’s
interest. However, this matching process leaks some informa-
tion such as the requested content name and the requester’s
subscription.
To limit this information exposure and preserve subscribers’
privacy, the authors suggested using a unique hashing function
to hash interests and content tags. These brokers may then
use these hashed values instead of the raw interests and
content tags. To limit the authorized brokers’ access to these
values, the hashed values are also protected using ABE. The
overhead of interest hashing, ABE, and the corresponding per-
hop hash matching procedure increase content retrieval latency
significantly, thus undermining this approach.
4) Identity-Based Access Control: In identity-based cryp-
tography, either entities’ identities or the content names are
used as the public keys. This allows providers or the network
to authenticate a client using her identity. Hamdane et al. [126]
proposed an identity-based cryptography AC system based on
hierarchical tree-based content naming in which the entire sub-
tree of a parent node inherits the AC policy of the parent. In
order to control the access to a sub-tree’s content, the root of
the sub-tree, is assigned an encryption/decryption key pair and
a symmetric content encryption key.
The symmetric key is encrypted using the root’s encryption
key. To give an entity read access on a content, the root
decryption key is encrypted using the authorized entity’s public
key. Upon successful authorization, the entity retrieves the
encrypted symmetric key. An entity with write access must
also have access to the root’s encryption key. A lazy entity
revocation can be performed in this scheme, which requires
the root’s encryption/decryption key pair to be updated. This
prevents a revoked client from accessing new content, however
the client can access the contents published before revocation.
The old decryption key needs to be encrypted with the new
key, so that all newly added clients may access previously
published content. Considering that this procedure creates a
chain of encrypted keys, each revocation makes content access
more expensive.
To overcome the above drawback, the authors proposed a
credential and encryption-based AC mechanism in [127]. The
proposed mechanism introduces an AC manager (ACM), which
possesses the root key for a namespace and defines and enforces
AC policies for the namespace. Clients possess read and/or
write capabilities so they can publish content and/or request
content. To publish a content, a publisher queries the repository
to check whether the target namespace is subject to AC. In
the case that the name is protected, the publisher forwards its
credentials, signed with its private key to the ACM, and requests
an encryption and decryption key pair. The ACM returns the
encryption and decryption keys to an authorized publisher.
The publisher encrypts the content with a generated symmet-
ric key, encrypts the symmetric key with the encryption key,
and sends the encrypted content and the encrypted key to the
repository to be cached. When a client requests the content,
the encrypted data will be delivered along with the access
policy. The client then forwards its credentials to the ACM and
retrieves the decryption key, if its credentials satisfy the access
policy. However, the authors neglected the client revocation
problem. If a client that has access to several decryption keys
is revoked, it can still keep using the keys. To revoke it, all the
corresponding publisher contents need to be re-keyed. Also,
the authors do not mention how the ACM verifies if a client is
revoked or not and who performs the revocation.
Aiash et al. [128] proposed an identity-based AC mechanism
for NetInf. This mechanism involves two steps: registration
and the authorization. In the registration step, all clients and
publishers share their public keys (i.e., identities) with the name
resolution service (NRS). Upon a client’s authentication, the
NRS generates a sub-token (subscriber token) and encrypts
it with the client’s public key. To retrieve a content, a client
retrieves both its (encrypted) token and a pointer to the content
object from the NRS. The NRS replies with the identity of the
publisher, and the client may use its token to request the data
from the publisher.
On receiving a client request, the publisher first queries the
NRS to verify the authenticity of the sub-token. After token
authentication, the publisher sends a challenge to the client to
verify its identity. After authenticating the client, the publisher
verifies the client’s token against the content token, and if the
client is authorized to access the content it returns the content.
This scheme’s drawback is the communication overhead
introduced by both frequent queries to the NRS to verify
tokens and the challenge-response interaction between the client
and the publisher. Also, in this mechanism the authority of
making content AC decisions lies with the NRS, instead of the
publisher.
B. Encryption Independent Approaches to Access Control
In this category, we discuss approaches where the AC
mechanism is proposed as a generic framework and can use
different available encryption mechanisms. We pay attention
to the frameworks in these approaches without going into
the details of the encryption mechanism used. For example,
Kurihara et al. [129] proposed an AC framework that can use
any well-known cryptographic scheme. This framework utilizes
CCN’s manifest feature, and can leverage AC mechanisms,
such as group-based and broadcast-based AC. The entities in
the framework are content providers, clients, an encryption
and dissemination server, a key manager, and an access policy
manager. The key manager generates a symmetric key (nonce
key) for content encryption and sends it to the encryption and
dissemination server, which performs content encryption and
dissemination.
The nonce key is then encrypted by another encryption
algorithm depending on the underlying AC structure, e.g.,
broadcast encryption, attribute-based encryption, or session-
based encryption. The decapsulation key, the key that decrypts
the nonce key, is then encrypted by the access policy man-
ager under the authorized client’s public key and published
into the network. For content retrieval, an authorized client
(authorization happens at the content provider using the client’s
credentials) downloads the encrypted content, uses the content
manifest to locate the decapsulation key, and decrypts the
content. The authors suggested using lazy revocation, which
would allow revoked clients access to previously published con-
tent until it is re-encrypted and re-disseminated. Overcoming
this would require a significant overload–a downside for most
proposed AC schemes.
Fotiou et al. [130] proposed an AC enforcement method for
rendezvous-based ICN architectures. The model proposes the
use of an access control provider (ACP), which interacts with
publishers, rendezvous nodes (RNs), and subscribers to create
AC policies and authenticate subscribers against the policy. A
publisher first provides its AC policy to the ACP, which assigns
a URI to the policy. The publisher forwards the content, along
with the policy URI, to the RNs. A requesting subscriber will
receive the URI of the AC as well as a nonce from the RN.
Simultaneously, the RN forwards the nonce and the URI of
the relevant AC policy to the ACP. Upon receiving the client’s
credentials, the ACP verifies it against the policy and informs
the RN whether the client is permitted access. If permitted, the
RN sends the content to the client.
This approach has additional computation and communi-
cation overhead at RNs and/or routers which will increase
response latency. It requires the RN to store the AC policy
URI for each content. In addition, there is a need for a trusted
ACP, which may become a single point of failure. Finally, the
mechanism for subscriber revocation has not been discussed.
Singh [131] proposed a trust-based approach for AC in
pub/sub networks. In this scheme, a client has to establish
trust with a broker, an intermediate entity that authenticates
clients and publishers. During registration, a new client or
publisher presents its credentials and attributes to the broker,
which results in the establishment of trust. The publisher defines
an access policy and submits it to its broker.
A registered client requests content from its local broker.
If the local broker does not have the content, it returns the
information needed to locate the correct broker. The broker
possessing the content evaluates the trust and AC level of the
client. Despite the theoretically wide applicability of the pro-
posed scheme, the authors did not discuss client identification,
and access level identification/verification, client revocation,
communication overhead, and the broker network creation and
management of publisher-broker network interactions.
Tan et al. [132] proposed a solution to copyright protection
problem in the form of an AC mechanism. They proposed to
divide protected content into two portions: a large cacheable
portion, and a smaller portion which remains at the publisher.
Each client retrieves the small portion from the publisher to
reconstruct the content, thereby the publisher may enforce AC
on its content. In order to provide track-ability of authorized
clients, the authors suggested that the small portion be unique
to each client; each client’s copy stored at the publisher.
The request for this small portion allows publisher to track a
client. According to the authors, this also allows identification
of a malicious client that leaks its portion to an illegitimate user.
However, this verification may not be possible. If a malicious
authorized client gives its content to an illegitimate user and
the user downloads the rest of its content from the publisher,
there is no way that the publisher can know, which user’s small
share was used. Another drawback of this mechanism is also
the need for an always online provider.
Ghali et al. [133] tackled the AC problem using an interest-
based model, in contrast to popular encryption-based ap-
proaches. The two major design aspects of this approach are (1)
name obfuscation, and (2) authorized disclosure. The former
prevents unauthorized clients from obtaining the content name,
the latter requires each entity responding to a content request to
perform authentication/authorization on the publisher’s behalf.
The authors proposed encryption-based and hash-based name
obfuscation, in which each authorized client (either individually
or as part of a group) encrypts (with a symmetric key) or hashes
a suffix of the content name with a key shared with the provider.
The interest for a content carries a nonce, a time-stamp, and
a client identifier in its payload, and is signed by the client
using the client’s private key (individual/group). The provider,
upon receiving an interest, verifies the client’s signature and
fetches the client’s key to decrypt the encrypted portion of the
content name. The provider attaches the group’s public key to
the content (for signature verification) and forwards it to the
client. On receiving a content, the on-path routers, store the
obfuscated content name and the public key to authenticate the
subsequent requests for the same content from the same group
of clients. If the request cannot be authenticated it is dropped.
This approach has several concerns. Obfuscated content
names may result in several copies of a content being stored,
undermining caching effectiveness. The use of hashing for
name obfuscation would also require the provider to pre-
compute the hashed content names for each individual and
group–not computation and storage efficient. A revoked client
from a group can still request content until the provider revokes
its membership and updates the group’s keying material.
TABLE X: Summary and Classification of the Proposed Access Control Mechanisms
Mechanism Communication Computation Burden Additional Client Cache Access ControlOverhead Provider Network Client Infrastructure Revocation Utilization Enforcement
Encryption-Based
Broadcast Encryption
Misra et al. [112], [113] 3 7 7 3 Not Required Threshold Based Yes Client
Session-Based
Renault et al. [114], [115] 3 7 7 7 Required Not Considered No Network
Wang et al. [116] 3 3 7 7 Not Required Not Considered No Provider
Proxy Re-Encryption
Wood et al. [117] 3 3 7 7 Not Required Not Considered Yes Provider
Mangili et al. [118] 3 3 7 3 Not Required Partial Re-encryption Yes Client
Zheng et al. [119] 3 3 3 7 Not Required Not Considered Yes Network
Probabilistic Model
Chen et al. [120] 3 3 3 3 Not Required Daily Re-encryption Limited Provider/Network
Attribute-Based Encryption
Ion et al. [121] 3 7 7 7 Required Not Considered Yes Client
Li et al. [122], [123] 3 3 7 3 Required Not Considered Yes Client
Da Silva et al. [124] 3 7 3 7 Required Key Update per Revoc. Yes Network
Raykova et al. [125] 7 3 7 3 Required Not Considered No Client
Identity-Based Encryption
Hamdane et al. [126] 3 7 7 7 Not Required System Re-key Yes Provider
Hamdane et al. [127] 3 7 7 3 Required Not Considered Yes Network
Aiash et al. [128] 3 7 7 7 Required Not Considered No Provider
Encryption-Independent
Kurihara et al. [129] 3 7 3 7 Required Lazy Revocation Yes Provider
Fotiou et al. [130] 3 7 3 7 Required Not Considered Yes Network
Singh [131] 3 7 3 7 Required Not Considered Yes Network
Tan et al. [132] 3 3 7 7 Not Required Considered Yes Provider
Ghali et al. [133] 7 3 3 3 Not Required Not Considered Limited Provider/Network
Li et al. [134] 3 3 3 7 Not Required Not Considered Yes Provider
Li et al. [134] designed a lightweight digital signature and
AC scheme for NDN. The access policies are enforced using
provider generated tokens–metadata that indicate access levels.
Two private tokens, per authorized entity, enable content access
and integrity verification. Upon an entity’s request for a token,
the provider encrypts the token (generated by hashing a key
vector) based on the requester’s access level.
The provider combines a Merkle hash tree (generated using
content blocks and tokens) and a new key vector to create hash-
based signatures. For signature verification, a client regenerates
the Merkle hash tree, using the retrieved content and the new
token, and combines it with the obtained signature to extract
the original signing tokens. The signature is valid if this token
matches the token obtained from the content provider.
Although the proposed algorithm is faster than conventional
RSA signing, the entities must synchronize with the provider
for the correct version of the token. The provider also must
store, for each content, at least three tokens and their corre-
sponding key vectors at any time. The tokens also need to be
freshened at regular intervals for better security. Finally, client
revocation, one of the most important concerns of AC in ICN,
has not been discussed in this article.
C. Summary and Future Directions in Access Control
Table X presents a summary of the proposed AC mechanisms
for ICN. It compares the existing mechanisms on the basis
of their overhead: communication and computation, and the
entities that bear the computation burden. Client revocation
method, ability of cache utilization, and the entities that enforce
AC are other comparison features in Table X.
In this section, we reviewed the existing research in ICN
AC enforcement and specifically focused on models including
broadcast encryption-based [112], [113], attribute-based [121]–
[125], identity-based [126]–[128] session-based [114]–[116],
proxy re-encryption-based [117]–[119], and others [130]–[134]
models. Although almost all the proposed mechanisms intro-
duce communication overhead, some of the proposed mecha-
nisms [128], [130] require extensive interactions between an
AC manager and other network entities in order to enforce
access constraints. These interactions not only increase commu-
nication and computation overhead, but also require additional
infrastructure.
We believe that the availability of a content in caches is
undermined significantly if content access requires authentica-
tion and/or authorization from an always-online server, which is
difficult to guarantee. To truly exploit ICN’s intrinsic provisions
for content availability, an AC mechanism should refrain from
using an always-online entity. The work by Misra et al. [113]
is the first attempt in this direction.
Access right revocation is the other major concern of current
proposals for ICN AC management. Attribute-based mecha-
nisms [121]–[128], in general, either take the costly and inef-
ficient approach of per-revocation re-keying, or allow clients
to continue accessing cached content even after revocation.
Although we believe that the latter approach is more acceptable,
as it imposes less complexity, efficient access revocation is
a key design factor for scalable AC in ICNs. Some of the
proposed mechanisms [114], [119], [120], [124], [127], [130],
[131], [133] require the network (routers) to enforce AC and
authenticate clients. The fact that the intermediate routers have
to perform authentication procedure undermines the scalability
of these mechanisms. There is scope for improvements on all
these noted fronts.
We note that some of the proposed mechanisms target spe-
cific architectures, such as pub/sub based architectures [125],
[130], [131], NetInf [114], [115], [128], or CCN/NDN [129],
[134]. However, the majority of the proposed mechanisms
are generic and can apply to all ICN architectures. There
are some exceptions. The work by Kurihara et al. [129] is
applicable to architectures with the manifest feature (e.g.,
CCN). The mechanisms proposed by Li et al. [122], [123] and
Ghali et al. [133] modify the content name and hence are only
applicable to architectures with flexible content naming scheme.
The proposal by Hamdane et al. [126] is limited to architectures
with a hierarchical naming scheme.
5. CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED
In this survey, we have comprehensively explored the ex-
isting work in the domain of ICN security. We divided the
content into three major sub-domains: security, privacy, and
access control enforcement. We reviewed the existing work in
each sub-domain, and highlighted the drawbacks and benefits
of each proposed solution. Additionally, we provided potential
future research directions to explore to overcome the mentioned
shortcomings.
In the security section, we explored attacks such as denial
of service, content poisoning, and cache pollution, and also
presented the proposed models for secure naming, routing, and
applications. The majority of the existing works in this sub-
domain aim to prevent adversaries from degrading the user
QoS and QoE through malicious behavior, such as interest
flooding, cache pollution, and packet forgery. However, the
negative impacts of these solutions on legitimate clients have
not been studied in depth. Among these attacks, DoS is the most
widespread and the easiest to mount. A simple rate limiting
approach can mitigate the impact of the attack to some extent,
however, it also can starve legitimate clients. Thwarting content
poisoning attack, despite its detection simplicity, requires com-
putational resources at the intermediate routers, which makes
it more severe.
ICN privacy threats can affect content, caches, and the
clients. Timing and monitoring attacks specifically target
cached content in the router shared between a victim and an
attacker threatening both the victim’s and the cache’s privacy.
Proposed countermeasures such as applying random delay can
protect the attack targets at the expense of latency. Protocol
attacks caused by ICN protocol design flaws target cache
privacy, while naming and signature privacy attacks target the
name and signer privacy respectively. Among the privacy risks
that we have explored, we believe requested content anonymity
is of the utmost importance in ICNs.
The availability of content replicas at various locations out-
side the publisher’s control creates need for more sophisticated
access control mechanisms for ICN. The majority of the access
control mechanisms in the state of the art rely on the existence
of an online service to authorize each content request. How-
ever, per-content online authorization dramatically increases
the communication overhead, and can also undermine content
availability if the authorization service goes down; regardless
of the presence of the desired content in a nearby cache. There
is a need for an access control mechanism that guarantees
the usability of the cached content, regardless of the content
provider’s availability. This can be achieved through enforcing
access control by network elements that cache the content.
However, the computation and communication overheads at the
routers of the authentication and authorization processes can
become excessive.
In what follows, we identify the lessons we have learned
while reviewing the state of the art in ICN security.
First, the negative impacts of proposed security protocols
on legitimate clients can be significant and this impact’s mit-
igation should be further investigated. Approaches such as
rate limiting on suspicious interfaces and name prefixes may
mitigate DoS attacks, however they come at the cost of quality
of service degradation for legitimate clients. By preventing
content caching through either tunneling or request flagging
many privacy-focused schemes also inadvertently affect user
QoE and QoS. For example, a privacy-sensitive client may
unnecessarily mark all its content as private thus making
caching ineffective. This will result in increased network load,
and increased download latency for other users.
The architectures that use name based routing to route
requests across the network (CCN, NDN, MobilityFirst) will
fare better in the face of DoS/DDoS attacks on account of
greater network-spread of interests and request aggregation; this
is in contrast to architectures that route to specific set of nodes
for efficiency (NetInf, PURSUIT) and hence adversely impact
attack resilience. If end-to-end privacy by tunneling or other
mechanisms are used, the network-wide routing approaches
cannot benefit from in-network caching. At that point nothing
separates the two architecture classes; the better the infrastruc-
ture the better the resilience.
The second lesson learned is that security concerns should be
addressed at the intrinsic level. For example, content poisoning
and cache pollution attacks are enabled due to lack of secure
naming and caching schemes. We believe that these attacks
should be solved intrinsically by employing strong cache
verification mechanisms and self-certifying naming schemes,
which would inherently eliminate unpopular content from the
cache and prevent forged content from lingering in the net-
work. Similarly, a scalable naming scheme would not only
eliminate many opportunities for malicious behavior, but it
also will improve the efficiency of content routing. We note
that despite these issues in-network caching is becoming a
preferred approach, especially at the network-edge, propelled
by the rapid developments in 5G technologies. Architectures
that enable pervasive caching will thus receive more and more
attention.
Third, in ICN, the privacy risks emanate from the data
interest traveling in plaintext in the network. In the era of
widespread consumer profiling, in which data consumption
information are invaluable to corporations, service providers,
and censors, existing ICN architectures have a wide attack
surface for data collection. Although a handful of proposed
mechanisms try to achieve communication anonymity, they
approaches have tended to port previous solutions from IP to the
ICN paradigm. We believe more needs to be done to develop a
mechanism, which can preserve privacy, while still leveraging
the inherent ICN benefits. In this scenario, it is not very clear
which class of architecture would perform the best for privacy;
more research is needed to answer this question.
Fourth, the fundamental principles of ICN should be closely
followed during the design of new security mechanisms. Here,
we specifically refer to the necessity of efficient access con-
trol enforcement mechanisms that are in agreement with ICN
principles. ICN, in principle, promotes content availability by
allowing pervasive caching, and hence requires more advanced,
service-independent access control mechanisms. In this survey,
we have identified some initial attempts towards an independent
access control mechanism that can be enforced by any network
caching entities efficiently. Again, in this context it is not clear
if there is a specific architecture that stands out as best for
access control; but we note that all architectures are nascent
and still under a lot of flux. We suggest the research community
must keep ICN principles in mind, such that future access
control schemes may protect content without undermining
features necessary for the future mobile devices and 5G-enabled
Internet, such as in-network caching and use of multiple radio
technologies concurrently for communication.
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